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INTRODUCTION 
Is welfare the problem or the solution? The longstanding co-
nundrum of political econom/ was posed anew and with urgency 
by Charles Murray two decades ago and has dominated discourse 
on welfare policy ever since. According to Murray, the design of 
federal non-insurance-based income support programs for the 
poor-in particular, the program known as Aid for Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC)2-has undermined its own aim of re-
ducing material want chiefly through two effects: by reducing work 
effort and readiness and by makin~ it easier to avoid marriage and 
to bear children out of wedlock. Murray's critics have focused 
mainly on the contention that welfare encourages extramarital 
childbearing and have sought to show that poor women's decisions 
to reproduce or marry are not influenced by the availability or level 
of benefits .4 According to critics, the primary sources of these pat-
terns of behavior lie elsewhere: in dim economic prospects for 
unskilled labor; in complex demographic and social changes within 
the community at large; in the general diminution in restraint, sex-
ual responsibility, and moral standards; in racism; and in the 
widespread abatement of the stigma and social disapprobation at-
tached to extramarital motherhood and illegitimate birth.5 
1. See, e.g. , Alexis de Tocqueville, Memoir on Pauperism, reprinted in 70 PUB. 
INTEREST 102 (1983). 
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-615 (1 988). The AFDC program provides benefits to poor 
families with minor children deprived of p arental support or care by the death, con-
tinued absence, or incapacity of a paren t. See 42 U.S.C. § 606(a); 45 C.F.R. § 
233.90(a)(l) (1995). 
3. See CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND (1976); Charles Murray, No. Welfare 
Isn 't Really the Problem, 84 Pus. INTEREST 3 (1986); Charles Murray, Does Welfare Bring 
More Babies ?, 115 PUB. INTEREST 17 (1994). 
4. See, e.g. , Robert Greenstein, Losing Faith in 'Losing Ground,' NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 
25, 1985, at 12, 13; CHRISTOPHER JENCKS, RETHINKING SOCIAL POLICY 79-91 (1992); 
MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE U NDESERVING POOR 153-65 (1989); THEODORE R. MARMOR ET 
AL., AMERICA'S MISUNDERSTOOD WELFARE STATE 104-14 (1990). 
5. See, e.g., MYRON MAGNET, THE DREAM AND THE NIGHTMARE: THE SIXTIES' 
LEGACY TO THE UNDERCLASS (1996) (arguing that inner city problems are largely 
cultural and a n egative consequence of the liberal sixties); ANDREW HACKER, Two 
NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE, UNEQUAL (1 992) (pointing to in-
creased unemployment, greater use of drugs, and higher numbers of people in 
prison as partial explanations for high pregnancy rates among Black teenagers); Wil-
liam Julius Wilson & Kathryn M. Neckerman, Poverty and Family Structure, in 
FIGHTING POVERTY: WHAT WORl<S AND WHAT DOESN'T 18-25 (Sheldon H. Danziger 
& Daniel H. Weinberg eds., 1986) (arguing that the rise in out-of-wedlock births is a 
social trend largely independent of the availability of welfare benefits) ; see also 
WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED (1987) (finding a direct rela-
tionship between the rise in Black, female-headed households and the increase in 
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Since Murray wrote Losing Ground, marriage rates have contin-
ued to decline and illegitimacy rates to skyrocket, especially among 
minorities, the uneducated , and the poor. 6 Concern about these 
trends has fueled pressure from some quarters to recast welfare law 
to reduce putatively perverse effects on family structure and repro-
ductive behavior. 7 Some commentators, including Charles Murray, 
William J. Bennett, and Charles Krauthammer, have suggested that 
only draconian measures will reverse these alarming trends. 8 They 
have advised the complete withdrawal of cash benefit payments to 
poor families consisting of an unmarried mother with children born 
out of wedlock.9 
Black m ale joblessness); David Frum, It's Big Government, Stupid, COMMENTARY 29 
(1994) (asserting that govemment welfare programs were created, in part, to reduce 
the need to rely on family m embers and so have naturally led to a breakdown in 
family stability); Christopher Jencks & Kathryn Edin , Do Poor Women Have a Right to 
Bear Children?, 20 AM. PROSPECT 43, 48-52 (1995) (emphasizing that the shortage of 
good jobs and good husbands makes government-supported single parenthood an 
a ttractive option for many women). 
6. The out-of-wedlock birth rate s tands at 68% among Blacks and 25% among 
Whites . 141 CONG. REC. H3712-13 (daily ed. Mar. 23, 1995) (statement of Andrea 
Seastrand); Ed Rubenstein, The Economics of Crime: The Rational Criminal, VITAL 
SPEECHES, Oct. 15, 1995, at 19-21; Dorian Friedman, U.S. News: The Flawed Premise of 
Welfare Reform, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 11 , 1995, at 32. The incidence varies 
dramatically by income and education. See ARLENE F. SALUTER, U.S. BUREAU OF 
CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, POPULATION CHARACfERISTICS, MARITAL 
STATUS, AND LNING ARRANGEMENTS 36 (1993) (stating that in 1992, 23% of children 
born to families with income under $5000 were born out of wedlock, compared to 
fewer than 1% of children born to families with income greater than $50,000); id. 
(fewer than 1% of children born to women with a graduate d egree were born out of 
wedlock, whereas 36% of children born to women without a high school diploma 
were born out of wedlock); see also infra note 159 and accompanying text. 
7. See Charles Murray, The Coming White Underclass, WALL ST. ] ., Oct. 29, 1993, a t 
A14. 
8. See id.; see also Charles Murray, What to Do About Welfare, 98 COMMENTARY 26 
(Dec. 1994) ; Charles Krauthammer, Subsidized 1//egitimacy, WASH. POST, N ov. 19, 
1993, at A29; William J. Bennett, The Best Welfare Reform: End It, WASH. POST, Mar. 30, 
1994, at A19. 
9. Sec supra no te 7. Murray focuses on single-parent families formed through ou t-
of-wedlock birth rather than divorce; he is mainly concerned in his work with the 
causes and effects of illegitimacy, which he calls the "single most important social 
problem of our time," Murray, supra note 7. This article also focuses primarily on 
illegitimacy, rather than marital breakup . That is because this article is about welfare 
policy. Illegitimacy rather than divorce is the most important source of single-parent 
families among the population of welfare recipients. That in part reflects the fact tha t 
marriage rates have fallen to very low levels among the poor. In 1992, of the total 
population of AFDC recipient households w ith one adult, 48% were households in 
which the single parent had never been married, as opposed to 11% in which the 
parents were divorced or legally separated, and 11.7% in which the parents were n ot 
yet legally separa ted or divorced. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 
103D CONG., OVERVIEW OF ENTITLEMENT PROGRAMS 409 tbl.l0-31 (1994) [hereinafter 
1994 GREEN BOOK]. Moreover, unmarried mothers are overrepresented among long-
term AFDC recipients. The average number of years on AFDC is 4.37 for widowed 
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Despite much hand-wringing among politicians over the corro-
sive effects of existing welfare programs on traditional family life, 
federal lawmakers have never seriously considered enacting the 
radical proposals of Charles Murray and friends directly into federal 
law. This caution is understandable: even apart from the political 
fallout of such a move, there would, at least in the short run, be con-
siderable human cost and upheaval among the poor, who have 
developed habits and expectations geared to a quite different and 
more forgiving rule. Shortly before this article went to press, how-
ever, Congress passed, and President Clinton signed into law, the 
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 
1996.10 The statute's preamble states that "prevention of out-of-
wedlock pregnancy and reduction in out-of-wedlock birth are very 
important Government interests." The Act goes on to assert that "the 
policy contained in [the statute] is intended to address the crisis" of 
out-of-wedlock childbearing. The statute abolishes the federal AFDC 
entitlement program and replaces it with block grants to the states, 
which can be used to fund cash benefits for poor families under 
specified conditions. For example, teenage mothers who receive 
benefits must live with their parents or a legal guardian, mothers 
must establish their children's paternity, states may deny additional 
benefits for children born while on welfare, parents of children re-
ceiving benefits must meet work requirements, and states must limit 
eligibility for cash benefits to five years. 11 Apart from these restric-
tions, the Act refrains from establishing eligibility requirements for 
cash disbursements under the state block grant programs. Although 
the limits of the states' discretion to depart from preexisting eligibil-
ity requirements have yet to be established and are likely to be 
subject to future litigation, the law appears to give states consider-
able leeway to "experiment" with imposing new and creative limits 
on eligibility as part of a broader effort to reduce the illegitimacy 
rate and strengthen traditional family life. 
It is possible to conceive of three main approaches to manipulat-
ing income supports in the hopes of influencing marital and 
childbearing behavior. One is the plan Charles Murray suggests: 
cutting off existing welfare benefits for single-parent families . Since 
most two-parent families do not now receive federal income 
recipients, 4.9 for divorced recipients, 6.8 for separated recipients, and 9.33 for 
unmarried recipients. See id. at 443 tbl.l0-44. 
10. See H.R. 3734, 104th Cong. (1996); see also Greg McDonald, President Signs 
"Historic " Welfare Reform Measure, HOUSTON CHRON., Aug. 23, 1996, at A1 ; Francis X. 
Clines, Clinton Signs Bill Cutting Welfare: States in New Role, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1996, 
at Al. 
11 . See H.R. 3747, tit. I,§ 103. 
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support/ 2 that approach would be tantamount to a dramatic reduc-
tion in direct cash grants to the poor. Another possible approach is 
to provide cash grants to poor families on a "family-neutral" basis-
that is, to establish something like a "guaranteed income" program 
for families without demanding any particular marital or legal rela-
tionship among family members. Finally, the government can 
choose to extend benefits selectively to (some or all) intact, two-
parent families while refusing to supply cash to all the rest. 
Although I will have something to say about all three options in 
this article, it is the last approach on which I focus . This essay seeks 
to explore in a preliminary way some questions that would be raised 
by the adoption of such a program. The initial issue raised by the 
proposal is: does the government ever have any legitimate business 
favoring some family forms over others? The first-pass answer 
would appear to be "yes." The law recognizes marriage, restricts it to 
persons of the opposite sex (at least for now), 13 and confers upon 
married couples comparative rights and privileges-although fewer 
than have been enjoyed in the past.14 The more difficult questions 
are: what exactly is the nature of the government's interest in pro-
moting certain types of family life, and what are the limits on the 
forms that the favoritism may take? Specifically, what is the place of 
"family policy" in the design of benefits programs for the poor? May, 
12. Some married couples with children were eligible to receive money under the 
federal AFDC-U program, which provides cash benefits to intact families with one 
unemployed parent. 1994 GREEN BOOK, supra note 9, at 326. As of October 1, 1990, 
states operating AFDC programs were also required to offer AFDC-U. Id. As of 1994, 
all 50 states were operating AFDC programs. !d. at 324. AFDC-U was abolished by 
the new welfare reform legislation. 
13. See, e.g., Mark Strasser, Domes tic Relations Jurisprudence and the Great, Slumber-
ing Baehr: On Definitional Preclusion, Equal Protection, and Fundamental Interests, 64 
FORDHAM L. REv. 921 (1995) (arguing that statutes prohibiting same-sex marriages 
are unconstitutional) ; Barbara J. Cox, Same-Sex Marriage and Choice-of-Law: If We 
Marry in Hawaii, Are We Still Married When We Return Home?, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 1033 
(same) ; Anthony C. Infanti, Baehr v. Lewin: A Step in the Right Direction for Gay 
Rights? , 4 LAW & SEXUALITY 1 (1994) (same). 
14. See, e.g., Jana Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 WIS. L. REv. 1443, 
1447-56 (explaining how traditional law sharply distinguished between married and 
unmarried couples and how that distinction has begun to break down); Carl E. 
Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of American Family Law, 83 MICH. L. 
REV. 1803, 1819-21 (1985) (discussing how the decline in moral discourse in family 
law has contributed to changing mores on the benefits of marriage) ; Mary Ann Glen-
don, Marriage and the State. The Withering Away of Marriage, 62 VA. L. REv. 663, 698 
(1976) (discussing how social factors have contributed to the withdrawal of the lega l 
system from the regulation of marriage); see also David D. Haddock & Daniel D. 
Polsby, Family as a Rational Classification, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 14, 37-38 (1996) 
(suggesting that the state has a legitimate interest in promoting marriage and the 
formation of traditional families because nontraditional famili es are unstable and 
produce negative ex ternalities that are imposed on the community) . 
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or should, the government seek to "privilege" certain family ar-
rangem ents over others when formulating welfare policy and 
h anding out government largesse? What is the justification for doing 
so? Is there any reason to believe that such m easures will accomplish 
their stated purpose? How certain must we be that su ch programs 
will w ork before w e can "rationally" ad opt them? 
The answ ers to these questions are dauntingly complex. A full 
analysis requires consideration of such issues as the proper scope for 
state action in a liberal , democratic state , the relationship of law and 
m orality, the reach of the constitutional doctrines of equal protection 
and the right to privacy, and the problem of unconstitutional condi-
tions. As d iscussed below, the analysis also forces consideration of 
empirical (or at least experiential) questions concerning the facts of 
social life, behavioral psychology, and the interplay of law and social 
norms. Plenary consideration of all issues is, of course, beyond the 
scop e of this article. My objective here is much more modest : to set 
out some of the questions that are raised by the government's at-
tempts to establish rules at the intersection of family law and welfare 
policy, and to suggest how some of those questions ought to be 
analyzed. 
My discussion takes as its starting point the obscure per curiam 
Supreme Court opinion in New Jersey Welfare Rights Organization v. 
Cahill .15 Cahill is unique in confronting the Court with a state statute 
that based qualification for cash welfare benefits on conformity to a 
narrowly defined , traditional "two-parent family" model.16 Although 
the Court's opinion in Cahill is short and far from comprehensive, it 
nevertheless is revealing of broader methods of judicial analysis, 
which in turn reflect general ways of thinking about the relationship 
of government benefits programs to social trends and individual be-
havior. I begin by dissecting the views and assumptions underlying 
the Court 's approach in Cahill and in the cases upon which the Court 
relies in Cahill. I attempt to criticize those views and assumptions as 
based on an impoverished and distorted picture of social reality and 
on a misunderstanding of the role the government may play-and 
must inevitably play-in shaping that reality. In so doing, I do not 
purport to offer a comprehensive solution to the host of thorny 
15. 411 U.S. 61 9 (1973) (per curiam) , afj'g 349 F. Supp . 491 (D.N .J. 1972). 
16. The Court has, of course, decided many cases in which the determina tion of 
eligibility for benefits, or the amount of benefits granted , turned on some asp ec t of 
the biological or legal relationship among family members. See, e.g ., Sullivan v. 
Stroop, 496 U.S. 478 (1990); Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. 282 (1979); Califano v. Jobs t, 
434 U.S. 47 (1977); Ma thews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 41 7 
U.S. 628 (1974); United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973). N one of 
these cases, however, considered statutes that imposed as stringent and " traditional" 
a restriction on eligibility as the statute a t issue in Cahill. 
SUMMER 1996] The Two-Parent Family 497 
doctrinal or theoretical problems that arise whenever democratic 
governments attempt to restrict the categories of eligibility for gov-
ernment largesse. In particular, this is not an attempt to offer a new 
approach to the famous problem of "unconstitutional conditions."17 
Nor do I claim to supply anything like a complete analysis of the 
status of legislation that elevates one moral point of view over others 
within the democratic liberal state. Rather, my discussion is aimed at 
revealing conceptual flaws in both judicial analysis and scholarly 
commentary concerning legislative attempts to shape individuals' 
reproductive behavior and patterns of family affiliation. The analysis 
of judicial doctrine sets the stage for a broader discussion of the is-
sues raised by attempts to influence behavior through the specific 
device of selectively directing government benefits to certain types 
of families. 
The focus of the doctrinal discussion will be on the courts' 
failure (which reflects a broader flaw in judicial and scholarly 
thinking in the areas of family law and sexual "privacy") to take 
proper account of the interaction of law with informal social norms 
and expectations. In particular, I will discuss the tendency to ignore 
or discount social harms flowing from individual conduct in the 
arena of sexuality and family life, and explore the relationship 
between that tendency and the idea that if such harms exist, they are 
"socially constructed"-that is, they spring from perverse legal rules 
rather than from autonomous, extralegal forces . Tr.e behavioral 
sources of the harms need not be eliminated because the harms can 
always be abated by devising and adopting the right remedial social 
policies. Using what I argue is a less distorted and more realistic 
framework for analysis, I tentatively conclude that restricting 
welfare benefits to "favored" family forms can be justified in light of 
current social realities and projected effects. Encouraging persons to 
bear children within the context of the two-parent family is 
important because (1) out-of-wedlock childbearing causes social 
17. As Lynn Baker has stated, "In the case of welfare benefits ... any 'eligibility 
requirement'--even a showing that one's income is below the government-
established 'poverty' level-is arguably a ' condition ' on receipt of the benefit." Lynn 
A. Baker, The Prices of Rights. Toward a Positive Theory of Unconstitutional Conditions, 
75 CORNELL L. REv. 1185, 1189 (1990). For a discussion of the unconstitutional condi-
tions problem, see Michael W. McConnell, The Selective Funding Problem: Abortions 
and Religious Schools, 104 HARV. L. REV. 989 (1991) ; Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanc-
tions: The Problem of Negat ive Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 1293 (1984); 
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1413 (1 989); 
Richard A. Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 
102 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1988); see also Brooks R. Fudenberg, Unconstitutional Conditions 
and Greater Powers: A St1sceptibility Approach, 43 UCLA L. REV. 371 (1995); Jonathan 
Romberg, Is There a Doctrine in the House? Welfare Reform and the Unconstitutional 
Conditions Doctrine, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1051 (1995). 
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harm; and (2) the government is inherently limited in its ability to 
compensate for the harms flowing from extramarital births. 
Moreover, selectively withholding cash benefits is a justifiable 
method of attempting to decrease the incidence of that harm. I argue 
that important determinants of out-of-wedlock childbearing are 
extralegal, and depend on economic factors enhanced and shaped by 
relatively autonomous norms of social life. The best way to minimize 
the number of single-parent families is to avoid undermining 
preexisting social conventions and practices that buttress the 
traditional family. A selective subsidy might be an effective way to 
accomplish this purpose, and is superior to a formally more 
evenhanded approach, such as a "guaranteed income," which treats 
all family forms alike. A realistic understanding of the dynamics of 
normative constraints on reproductive behavior and family 
formation supports the conclusion that guaranteed incomes 
encourage the abandonment of the two-parent family norm, whereas 
selective subsidies are more likely to preserve the two-parent 
pattern. 
I. NEW JERSEY WELFARE RIGHTS ORGANIZATION V. CAHILL 
In Cahill,18 the Supreme Court was called upon to decide 
whether the New Jersey "Assistance to Families of the Working 
Poor" (AFWP) program violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. The state program, en-
acted by the New Jersey legislature in 1971, coincided with the 
state's abandonment of the federal-state program known as AFDC-
U-the part of AFDC providing benefits to families with children in 
which the primary breadwinner is unemployed .19 The program 
functioned as a supplement to AFDC, which continued in operation 
in New Jersey. The AFWP program provided for income supple-
ments to families with children "when independent sources of 
income are inadequate for family support."20 The program was en-
tirely state-financed, and eligibility was restricted to defined 
categories of families. Specifically, benefits were limited to families 
consisting of "a household composed of two adults of the opposite 
sex ceremonially married to each other who have at least one minor 
18. 411 u.s. 619 (1973) . 
19. See supra note 12; New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 349 F. Supp. 491 , 
493 n.1 (D.N.J. 1972); see also Amending the "Assistance to Families of the Working Poor 
Act ": Public Hearing on Assembly Bill No. 1201 Before the New Jersey Legislature, Assem-
bly, Institutions and Welfare Comm., at Index 3 (1972) (statement of Ann Klein, 
assemblywoman). 
20. New Jersey Welfare Rights, 349 F. Supp. at 493. 
.: 
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child ... of both, the natural child of one and adopted by the other, 
or a child adopted by both."21 
The program was challenged in federal court by a group of in-
eligible poor families in New Jersey. Before the district court, the 
plaintiffs argued, among other things, that the provision was invalid 
because it discriminated against illegitimate children without ade-
quate justification.22 The court noted that, whatever its effect, the 
classification in the statute was not expressly "directed at illegitimate 
children but rather the whole living unit. "23 It nevertheless felt con-
strained to deal with the Supreme Court decisions striking down 
21. N .J. STAT. ANN.§ 44:13-3(a) (West 1971) (repealed 1977). The statute provided, 
in pertinent part: 
There is hereby enacted by the State of New Jersey a program of assistance to 
be known as "Assistance to the Families of the Working Poor" [AFWP], which 
shall benefit all of the citizens of New Jersey meeting the eligibility provi-
sions .... 
"Assistance to the Families of the Working Poor" means the financial assis-
tance and other services to be extended under this act to those families 
residing in New Jersey which consist of a household composed of two adults 
of the opposite sex ceremonially married to each other who have at least one 
minor child under the age of 18 residing with them, who shall be either the 
natural child of both, the natural child of one and adopted by the other, or a 
child adopted by both .... 
§§ 44:13-2 to -3(a). 
22. In its initial complaint, and before the district court, the New Jersey Welfare 
Rights Organization argued that the AFWP discriminated against illegitimate chil-
dren and that it also distinguished without justification between married and 
unmarried persons. The statute was also claimed to discriminate against Blacks be-
cause Black cohabiting couples were less likely to be married, and Black children 
were less likely than Whites to live in families in which the parents were married to 
each other. See New Jersey Welfare Rights, 349 F. Supp. at 494-95, 498 (citing to Corn-
plaint at Counts 7, 10 (filed July 15, 1971 , and amended at pretrial conference Dec. 15, 
1971)) . 
The plaintiffs abandoned the racial discrimination argument following the 
district court's decision, and refrarned their remaining arguments before the Su-
preme Court to focus on the appropriate level of scrutiny under the Equal Protection 
Clause and on the rationality of the statutory distinctions in light of the State's pur-
pose in enacting a needs-based welfare program. The questions posed to the Court 
included whether "the State [may] attempt to promote marriage by denying welfare 
benefits to unmarrieds and their illegitimate children"; whether "the facts elicited a[t] 
trial substantiate the state rationale that the statute in question will promote more 
stable marital relationships"; and whether "the classification in question require[s] a 
mere showing of reasonableness .. . or a 'stricter scrutiny.' " Jurisdictional Statement 
at 5-6, New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973) (No. 72-6258). 
23. New Jersey Welfare Rights, 349 F. Supp. at 497. 
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state laws that made distinctions between illegitimate and legitimate 
children.24 
The district court stated that the Supreme Court had 
"recognized the legitimate interest of a state to attempt to preserve 
and strengthen traditional family life."25 The court noted that in most 
of the cases in which that goal had been asserted as the rationale for 
disfavoring illegitimate children or their relatives, the Supreme 
Court had found that the measure at issue fa iled to promote the 
stated interest because it could not be expected to reduce or prevent 
illegitimate births. 26 Thus, the general pattern the Court followed in 
the cases was to make a finding that there was no "rational relation-
ship" between admittedly valid ends-reducing illegitimacy and 
promoting marriage-and the means selected to achieve those ends. 
For example, in Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co.,27 
the Court explained that: 
we see no possible rational basis ... for assuming that if the 
natural mother is allowed recovery for the wrongful death 
of her illegitimate child, the cause of illegitimacy would be 
served. It would, indeed, be farfetched to assume that 
women have illegitimate children so that they can be com-
pensated in damages for their death. 28 
The Court made a similar point in Weber v. Aetna Casualty & 
Surety Co., stating that "it [cannot] be thought here that persons will 
shun illicit relations because the offspring may not one day reap the 
benefits of workmen's compensation."29 
There were, however, at least two additional themes in the ille-
gitimacy cases cited by the district court in Cahill that were given 
almost no attention by that court. In Levy v. Louisiana,30 the Supreme 
Court did not rely on the assertion of a lack of connection between 
chosen means (denying the illegitimate child an enforceable right) 
24. Jd. at 495. The cases decided prior to Cahill included Weber v. Aetna Casualty & 
Surety Co. , 406 U.S. 164 (1972) (striking down a law that denies unacknowledged 
illegitimate children the right to recover workmen's compensation benefits of the 
natural father); Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co., 391 U.S. 73 
(1968) (invalidating a state law barring the natural mother from recovering for the 
wrongful death of her illegitimate child); and Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) 
(striking down statute denying illegitimate children recovery fo r wrongful death of 
the mother). See also Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971) (upholding state law giv-
ing illegitimate children fewer rights than legitimate children to inherit intestate). 
25. New Jersey Welfare Rights, 349 F. Supp. at 496. 
26. Id. 
27. 391 U.S. 73 (1 968). 
28. I d. at 75. 
29. Weber, 406 U.S. at 173. 
30. 391 U.S. 68 (1968). 
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and the state's goal (discouraging illegitimacy). Rather, the Court 
explained that the statute was irrational because the circumstances 
of a child's birth has no obvious bearing on "the nature of the wrong 
allegedly inflicted on the mother."31 The Court noted that the chil-
dren in the case, "though illegitimate," were "dependent on [the 
mother],"32 and thus suffered a concrete loss from her death. Implicit 
in the Court's discussion is the assumption that the wrongful death 
statute had the single purpose of compensating dependent third 
parties for the loss of the decedent. If a loss was suffered, then com-
pensation was in order. In light of this logic, the exclusion of 
illegitima.tes made no sense. The Weber Court picks up this theme in 
striking down a bar to an unacknowledged illegitimate child's re-
covery of a father's workmen's compensation benefits. There, the 
Court stated that "[a]n unacknowledged illegitimate child may suf-
fer as much from the loss of a parent as a child born within wedlock 
or an illegitimate later acknm:_.rledged,"33 implying that there could 
be no valid reason to deny compensation in the face of such compa-
rable suffering. 
A second theme or line of argument in the illegitimacy cases 
decided before Cahill also fails to appear in the district court's 
analysis. In addition to the two types of "irrationality" already iden-
tified-the lack of behavioral effect of the exclusion, and the lack of a 
conceptual connection between the exclusion and the statute's ulti-
mate purpose-the Supreme Court identifies a third, which was first 
noted by Justice Brennan in his dissent in Labine v. Vincent: 34 statutes 
that give illegitimate children fewer legal rights than legitimates can 
be regarded as "punish[ing] illegitimate children for the misdeeds of 
their parents."35 This theme is also taken up in Weber. There, the 
Court acknowledged that "(t]he status of illegitimacy has expressed 
through the ages society's condemnation of irresponsible liaisons 
beyond the bonds of marriage,"36 but added that: 
visiting that condemnation on the head of an infant is 
illogical and unjust. Moreover, imposing disabilities on the 
illegitimate child is contrary to the basic concept of our 
system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to 
individual responsibility or wrongdoing. Obviously, no 
child is responsible for his birth and penalizing the 
31. Id. at 72. 
32. Id. 
33. Weber, 406 U.S. at 169. 
34. 401 U.S. 532,541 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
35. Id. at 557. 
36. Weber, 406 U.S. at 175. 
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illegitimate child is an ineffectual-as well as an unjust-
way of deterring the parent.37 
There is some obscurity in the final sentence of this statement, 
but it is possible to speculate on what the Court means: the rule at 
issue is "ineffectual" because it cannot reasonably and in actual fact 
be expected to operate as a deterrent. The implication is that a pen-
alty directed at the child cannot possibly be effective in practice 
because the child, who has no control over the circumstances that 
trigger the penalty, cannot act to avoid it. That point appears distinct 
from a recognition of the tmfairness or injustice of penalizing chil-
dren for circumstances over which they have no control. 
The district court in Cahill focused neither on whether the chal-
lenged classification advanced the statute's primary "needs-based" 
purpose, nor on the seeming unfairness of "visiting the sins of the 
fathers on the sons." Rather, it decided that, unlike the rules at issue 
in Levy , Glona, and Weber, the New Jersey statute was not marred by 
the "lack of any relationship between the classification ... made and 
the interest sought to be advanced."38 The state was entitled to take 
measures to "preserve and strengthen traditional family life."39 In-
deed, as the district court pointed out, the law already favored the 
marital state by according privileges to its participants and requirin§ 
"exacting procedures before a family can be broken by divorce." 
According to the court, these measures had a functional justification: 
"[a] living arrangement which does not have the aura of permanence 
that is concomitant with a ceremonial marriage often does not pro-
vide the stability necessary for the instillment of those norms within 
the individual necessary for proper social behavior."41 
The court found that the AFWP advanced the ends of stabiliz-
ing the traditional marital bond by providing a "subsidy" for 
traditional family life. "The AFWP subsidizes families," stated the 
court, adding that: 
[t]he State has determined that it only wants to subsidize 
what it considers to be legitimate families, ones where the 
likelihood is greater for the instillment of proper social 
norms. It is certainly both a proper and a compelling state 
interest to refuse to subsidize a living unit which may lead 
37. Id . 
38. New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 349 F. Supp. 491 , 496 (D.N.J. 1972). 
39. Id. at 497. 
40. Id. 
41. Id . 
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to the state of anomie and which violates its laws against 
fornication and adultery. 42 
503 
The court cast aside the objection that the AFWP eligibility re-
striction was not the "wisest method of promoting family stability"43 
because it would fail to have the intended effect, or even backfire 
(i.e. , put an added strain on unwed couples who, but for the lack of 
state financial support, might have stayed together). The court 
pointed to the evidence presented during the brief trial that a flurry 
of marriages among beneficiaries had followed the enactment of the 
44 new program. 
The Supreme Court reversed the district court's decision, strik-
ing down the New Jersey program as a violation of the constitutional 
right to the equal protection of the laws. Without defining the terms 
"legitimate" or "illegitimate," or explaining precisely how the pro-
gram worked, the Court accepted at face value that the statute "in 
practical effect ... operates almost invariably to deny benefits to il-
legitimate children while granting benefits to those children who are 
legitimate."45 While acknowledging the validity of the statutory pur-
pose to "preserve and strengthen family life," the Court relied on its 
decisions in Weber, Levy, and the then recently decided case of Gomez 
v . Perez
46 to identify several flaws that infected the New Jersey law. 
First, the Court quoted in full the passage from Weber that speaks of 
penalizing the illegitimate child as "an ineffectual-as well as un-
just-way of deterring the parent."47 Repeating themes from Levy 
and Weber, the Court also explained that distinctions based on cir-
cumstance of birth made no sense in light of the principal purpose of 
the statute-which was to provide for the "well-being and health" of 
needy children.48 
The decision in Cahill, which was per curiam, suffers from haste 
and superficiality. From the point of view of conventional constitu-
tional doctrine, the decision is vulnerable on a number of counts. In 
contrast with the trilogy of illegitimacy cases upon which the Su-
preme Court relies, the eligibility criteria in the AFWP are primarily 
42. Id. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. 
45. New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619, 619-20 (1973) (per cu-
riam). 
46. 409 U.S. 535 (1973). In Gomez, the Court decided that a state may not recognize 
a judicially enforceable right to a natural father's support for legitimate children, 
while denying that same right to illegitimate children. By the term "illegitimate," the 
Court in that case appeared to mean children born out of wedlock. See id. at 536-37. 
47. New Jersey Welfare Rights, 411 U.S. at 620 (quoting Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. 
Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972)). 
48. Id. at 621. 
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familial, not individual: they rest on the marital status of the parents, 
in combination with the legal or biological relationship of the par-
ents to the children. The Court in Cahill paid little attention to the 
"fit" between the "suspect" category of illegitimate children and the 
classification created by the statute, nor did it add ress whether the 
p urpose or intent of the New Jersey AFWP was to put illegitimate 
children at a disadvantage. 49 
The doctrinal defects in the Court's analysis are of some conse-
quence. Cahill casts into d oubt the constitutional soundness of 
welfare p rograms that confine benefi ts to two-parent families by 
suggesting that such programs might impermissibly "discriminate" 
against illegitimate children. A closer look, however, reveals a rather 
complex scheme for determining w ho was "in" and who "out" of the 
category of those eligible for benefits under the New Jersey statute in 
Cahill. The scheme does not suggest that the decision to require a 
particular relationship between p arents, and between parents and 
children, should be taken as manifesting some type of legislative 
animus against illegitimate children. 
First, the statute is significantly overinclusive and somewhat 
underinclusive. It is overinclusive because it disqualifies many 
families consisting exclusively of legitimate children-for example, 
families formed through remarriage following divorce, where the 
only children present are the legitimate product of a previous mar-
riage who are not in a position to be adopted by the stepparent 
(because the natural ex-spouse has not relinquished parental rights). 
Secondly, the statute is also arguably underinclusive because it 
grants benefits to some families with illegitimate children present in 
the household. The Supreme Court completely overlooked the statu-
tory language stating that there must be at least one minor child 
living with the married couple, which child must be adopted by, or 
be the natural child of, each member of the parent couple. An eligi-
ble household could therefore include other children born out of 
wedlock (e.g., to the wife by a man other than her husband prior to 
her marriage), although the family might receive a lesser amount 
49. At the time of the Cahill decision, the law had not yet gelled on the question of 
whether the test of an equal protection violation, in the absence of a fa cially dis-
criminatory classifica tion, was one of effect or intent. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 
229 (1976), established that a neutral classification is invalid only if there is a finding 
of intent to discriminate, thus shifting the focus to the question of how a plaintiff 
could prove discriminatory purpose. Subsequent cases indicated that a "close fit" 
between the classification at issue and the suspect category would count as circum-
starltial evidence of intent. See Arlington Heights v. Metropoli tan Hous. Corp., 429 
u.s. 252 (1977). 
. l 
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than if all children qualified .50 Thus, the statute arguably does not 
exclude all illegitimate child ren from sharing in state largesse under 
- I 
the program. ' 
The Court also ignored the fact that whether a statute designed 
along the lines of the AFWP treats legitimate and illegitimate 
children differently d epends on state law governing the status of 
children born out of wed lock and on the avenues for changing that 
status through legitimation procedures. If there were mechanisms in 
New Jersey in 1971 by which children born out of wedlock could 
gain legal rights against their natural father, regardless of his 
marriage to the mother, that were similar to those enjoyed by fully 
legitimate ch.ild ren,52 then the effect of the statute wm.tld be to 
50. It is not enti rely clear from the cour ts' opinions in the case or from the parties' 
briefs exactly how the level of benefits was calcula ted under the New Jersey pro-
gram, but the record suggests that only a qualifying child was included in the family 
uni t for the purpose of calculating benefit amounts. N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 44:1 3-8 (West 
1971) (repealed1977). 
51. Neither the courts nor the parties specifically addressed the implications of the 
statutory language suggesting that no more than one child in the family need meet 
the qualifying criteria. At one point, the district court reports the plaintiffs' arguing 
that the statute "requires that the family must be one in which both parents are in the 
home, are ceremonially married to each other, and in which both parents are the 
natural or adoptive parents of children in the home," New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. 
v. Cahill, 349 F. Supp. 491, 493 (D.N.J. 1972) (emphasis added), which implies that all 
children must meet the criterion. Although it is possible that New Jersey applied the 
statute in this manner, I have discovered nothing else in the record to indicate this. 
52. The statute in New Jersey in 1971 governing legitimacy did not expressly pro-
vide for such a mechanism. The statute stated only that any child born out of 
wedlock could be legitimated by the subsequent marriage of his or her natural par-
en ts ar1d their recognition and treatment of the child as their own. The newly 
legitima ted child was to enjoy the same rights and privileges as children born in 
wedlock. The statute appears to leave open the possibility, however, that rights to 
iru'l erit from the father could be established through acknowledgment by the father 
under preexisting common law. See N .J. STAT. ANN.§ 9:15-1 (West 1960) (repealed 
1983). 
Under state law generally up to the 1970s, legitimacy was defined primarily 
"by reference to the marital status of the child 's parents, at the time of the child's 
birth." HAP~'\Y D. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND SoCIAL POLICY 10-11 (1971) 
[hereinafter KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY]. Various legal disabilities attached to a child 
born to an unmarried mother. !d. at 11-13. Until recently, sta te statutes governing 
"legi timation" varied widely in form and in operation, ranging from "procedures 
resulting in full legitimation, thus providing equality with legitimate children, to 
arrangements for 'partial' legitimation" with graduated effects on rights to support 
or inheritance. Jd. at 19-20; see also HARRY D. KRAUSE, CHILD SUPPORT IN AMERICA, 
THE LEGAL PERSPECTIVE at chs. Ill, IV (1981) (hereinafter KRAUSE, CHILD SUPPORT IN 
AMERICA]. A number of mechanisms were available for the "legitimation" of the 
child-the most important being the natural father's subsequent marriage to the 
mother. Other measures for full or partial "legitimation" included an official ac-
knowledgment of pa ternity on the part of the father (which could be written or oral, 
depending on the state) or a court-declared acknowledgment of paternity as the re-
sult of a paternity action. See HA.J\J.~Y D. KRAUSE, FAMILY LAW IN A NlJTSHELL 144-45 
506 Michigan Journal of Race & Law [VOL. 1:2 
exclude an even greater number of legitimate (in the sense of 
"legitimated") children from serving as a qualifying child. In other 
words, a family consisting of a single mother with a child born out of 
wedlock who is subsequently legitimated by the natural father 
might nevertheless fail to qualify for benefits, because the parents 
are not married to each other, or the mother is married to someone 
else. In light of these observations, the statute looks less and less like 
one intended to favor legitimate over illegitimate children, and more 
like one directed at a rather different purpose. 
Finally, the "fit" between the statutory classification and the 
category of illegitimacy depends on how that category is defined . 
The Supreme Court never makes clear what the Court itself means 
by "illegitimacy" in the context of its analysis under the federal Con-
stitution. Is it synonymous simply with the fact of being born out of 
wedlock, regardless of subsequent events? Or does it refer to con-
temporaneous legal status-a status that can be a function of the 
child's or parents' subsequent actions, and the significance and con-
sequences attached to those actions under state law. If 
discrimination against illegitimates is synonymous with less favor-
able treatment of children born out of wedlock (rather than of the 
(1977); KRAUSE, CHILD SUPPORT IN AMERICA, supra. The simple identification of the 
natural father, or cohabitation with him, did not necessarily "legitimate" the child in 
the sense of putting that child on a legal par with a child born to the father's marital 
union. 
At the time New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973), was 
decided, state rules regarding the status of children born out of wedlock, and the 
processes of "legitimation," were not uniform. See KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY, supra, at 
ch. I. For a 1981 update, see KRAUSE, CHILD SUPPORT IN AMERICA, supra. In response 
to a number of Supreme Court rulings, states have since moved in the direction of 
equalizing the status of children born in and out of wedlock by invalidating virtually 
every legal distinction between illegitimate and legitimate children, save those that 
flow from different presumptions of paternity and from the practical difficulties of 
identifying the natural father of some extramarital children. See HARRY D. KRAUSE, 
FAMILY LAW IN A NUTSHELL 167-70 (1995). Illegitimate children without an identifi-
able father still necessarily have fewer legal rights simply because there is no man 
against whom the rights can be readily asserted. Id. at 164-65. Once the father is 
identified and paternity established under state law, however, the child is usually 
fully "legitimated," in the sense that he is placed on par with a child born in wedlock 
with respect to virtually all rights and obligations between parent and child. See 
KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY, supra, at ch. I; see also HARRY D. KRAUSE, FAMILY LAW IN A 
NUTSHELL at ch. 11 (1986). Inheritance rights are one exception to this proposition. 
See Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 534 (1971) (holding that, in the context of inheri-
tance law, states could discriminate against those born out of wedlock). 
In 1973, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
promulgated The Uniform Parentage Act. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-38 (West 
1993 & Supp. 1996). This Act seeks to establish that all children and all parents have 
equal rights with respect to each other, regardless of the marital status of the parents, 
and also provides a procedure for establishing parentage in disputed cases. Id. As of 
1993, 18 states had adopted versions of the Act, including New Jersey's "New Jersey 
Parentage Act" of 1983. See id. 
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smaller group who ultimately fail to be fully legitimated), the AFWP 
is overinclusive, because it permits many such children to serve as a 
qualifying child.53 Indeed, if the state's assumed motive for a law 
were its disapproval of out-of-wedlock childbearing as such and its 
desire to punish children born under those circumstances, one 
would expect the law to accord less favorable treatment to children 
based on status at birth alone. Yet this is precisely what the AFWP 
does not do. Rather, it grants benefits to many families containing 
children born out of wedlock, provided they are "legitimated" in a 
certain manner and their parents marry. It is most plausible to de-
scribe the statute as seeking to encourage both marriage as such and 
the establishment of legal responsibility by both members of a mar-
ried couple for any children in their household.54 
In their zeal to strike down the law, the Court ignored these as-
pects of the law's operation. The record in the case is devoid of any 
indication that the parties paid much attention to them, either. The 
Court's inadequate analysis casts an unnecessary shadow over the 
prospects for similar programs in the future-that is, programs in 
which the entitlement scheme endeavors to promote traditional 
family patterns by creating distinctions that coincide only very 
roughly with the category of "illegitimacy." To be sure, the Court's 
illegitimacy cases may still pose a formidable obstacle to govern-
mental attempts to adopt welfare benefits programs that 
discriminate overtly against illegitimate children. Examples might 
be statutes that categorically deny benefits to children born out of 
wedlock, while granting benefits to all other children. But Cahill 
shows that it is possible to design benefits programs that use the 
government's spending power to try to create illegitimacy-
discouraging and marriage-promoting incentives without precisely 
targeting illegitimate children in this way. 
II. TRADITIONAL FAMILY LIFE AND LEGITIMATE STATE PURPOSES: 
THE COURT'S INCOMPLETE VISION 
Taking the New Jersey statute in Cahill as a starting point, we 
shift focus to the larger question of whether programs that fit the 
general pattern of the AFWP are a legitimate exercise of the state's 
legislative power. Put in more doctrinal terms, are such programs 
53. For example, it allows the payment of benefits to a family containing a child 
born out of wedlock to a woman who subsequently marries a man, other than the 
natural father, who then adopts the child. 
54. For an additional discussion of why the New Jersey legislature established the 
precise requirements of natural parenthood or adoption for each member of the mar-
ried couple in the AFWP, see infra discussion at 514-15. 
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"rationally related to some legitimate state purpose"? There are three 
main elements to this inquiry: identifying the possible justifications 
for the law; deciding whether the government may seek to accom-
plish those ends; and determining whether there is reason to believe 
that the programs in question will actually advance their stated pur-
poses. The Court in Cahill purported to address those questions, but 
did so inadequately by reiterating a series of legal and analytical 
maneuvers borrowed largely from the illegitimacy cases upon vvh ich 
it so heavily relied . The next section will be devoted to examining 
the Court's reasoning in the illegitimacy cases leading up to Cahill, 
and to analyzing the faulty v ision that prevented the Court from 
coming to grips with the real issues in those cases. The discussion 
will conclude with suggestions for a different approach to the issues 
raised by the cases-one that is more favorable to the view that gov-
ernment benefits can and should be confined to "favored family 
forms." 
A The Illegitimacy Cases: Atomistic Discourse and the Disregard of 
Mediating Norms 
The illegitimacy cases exemplify an analytical m ethod that I 
term "atomistic discourse." The method consists of conducting doc-
trinal analysis by breaking down the elements of the law at issue-as 
well as its purposes and effects-into the simplest possible compo-
nents, and then considering those components in artificial isolation. 
When legal analysis implicates questions of the effects of legal rules 
on human behavior-as it so often does-"atomistic discourse" takes 
the form of a highly individualistic approach to human motivation 
and social interaction. That approach looks at the impact of human 
choice and legal rules one person at a time, and gives short shrift to 
collective dynamics or to the long-term social effects of incremental 
shifts in incentives and expectations that might be brought about by 
changes in the law. 
"Atomistic" legal analysis is marked by a refusal to acknowl-
edge the possible existence or influence of informal or extralegal 
social norms. The cases relied upon in Cahill, for example, show an 
almost complete disregard for social convention as an independent 
force. As a consequence, the Court never addresses how informal 
customs, conventions, and mores might influence behavior, how 
they interact with legal rules, or whether the law has any obligation 
or reason to respect those social realities. To some extent, these 
omissions are understandable. In part they are a function of the 
types of challenges leveled against the laws at issue, which are 
grounded in the perceived violation of the rights of particular indi-
viduals. This context surely contributes to the courts' focus on the 
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law's effects on individuals abstracted from their social context. That 
focus, however, creates serious distortions in reasoning and conclu-
sions. 
1. Atomistic Discourse and the 
Supreme Court's Illegitimacy Cases 
In its illegitimacy jurisprudence, the Supreme Court manifests 
the narrow ness of its analytic focus in a number of different ways. 
First, the Court customarily posits a simple or unitary purpose for 
the statutory scheme at issue, thus insuring that any aspect of the 
scheme that advances some secondary, unrelated purpose will be 
found to be "irrational." Second, the rule under scrutiny is consid-
ered in legal isolation. The Court gives remarkably little attention to 
what might be termed legal synergy: that is, the way in which a par-
ticular rule might interact in a complex way with a range of other 
legal measures to shore up social institutions or to encourage what is 
thought to be a desirable social pattern. The Court seems totally un-
aware that the law at issue might be only one component of a larger 
legal scheme consisting of rules designed to work together and rein-
force each other. 
Third, the universe of analysis is a socially isolated one. The in-
fluence of the particular rule at issue is assessed without considering 
the multifarious, complex social setting on which the rule is brought 
to bear, or how changing the law might contribute over the long run 
to the alteration of that social setting. Finally, little or no weight is 
given to the statute's symbolic significance in signaling governmen-
tal support for social conventions that modulate or regulate 
behaviors.55 
The tendency to find a singular, unitary purpose for a statute or 
rule is illustrated by the Court's decisions in Levy v. Louisiana,56 Glona 
v. American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co.,57 Weber v. Aetna Casu-
alty & Surety Co.,58 and Gomez v. Perez,59 and is carried forward in the 
Cahill case. In all these cases, the differential treatment for illegiti-
mate children (or, in the case of Cahill, for some families containing 
55. This corresponds to one aspect of what Cass Sunstein terms the expressive 
function of the law. See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. 
L. REV. 2021, 2025-29 (1996) (describing some laws as serving to convey the message 
that certain behaviors or states of affairs are desirable, admirable, or valuable in 
themselves). 
56. 391 U.S. 68 (1968). 
57. 391 U.S. 73 (1968). 
58. 406 u.s. 164 (1972). 
59. 409 U.S. 535 (1973). 
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illegitimate children) is found inconsistent with the unitary purpose 
the Court identifies, thus obviating any discussion of whether there 
might be some secondary goals at work. In Levy, for example, the 
Court implied that the right of recovery for a mother's wrongful 
death was a function of, and served as compensation for, a child's 
loss of a person upon whom he was dependent. 60 By implication, the 
dependency was a necessary and sufficient condition for recovery, 
and birth status could not rationally be given any independent sig-
nificance. In Gomez, the Court characterized the Texas scheme as 
creating "a judicially enforceable right on behalf of children to 
needed support from their natural fathers,"61 thus expressing a 
judgment that the purpose of the statute was to provide for the ma-
terial needs of biological offspring-a purpose incompatible with the 
exclusion of impoverished illegitimate children. In Weber, the Court 
stated that "[a]n unacknowledged illegitimate child may suffer as 
much from the loss of a parent as a child born within wedlock,"62 
thus suggesting that the legislative purpose of the workmen's com-
pensation scheme at issue was to compensate dependents or 
relatives in a manner strictly proportional to their material need. Fi-
nally, in Cahill, the per curiam Court justified its decision by stating 
that "there can be no doubt that the benefits extended under the 
challenged program are as indispensable to the health and well-
being of illegitimate children as to those who are legitimate,"63 indi-
cating that providing material support to poor children was the sole 
and overriding purpose of the New Jersey program and the sole 
benchmark for the "rationality" of any aspect of its design. 64 
60. Levy, 391 U.S. at 72. 
61. Gomez, 409 U.S. at 538. 
62. Weber, 406 U.S. at 169. 
63. New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619, 621 (1973). 
64. In this respect, the Supreme Court's Cahill decisi::m is in keeping with the 
analytic method adopted by the Court in many of its prior attempts to divine the 
congressional purpose behind a broad spectrum of statutory and regulatory restric-
tions placed on eligibility for welfare payments and in-kind benefits: the Court first 
identifies an exclusive "needs-based" rationale for the program and then tests every 
condition against that purpose. See, e.g., King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 318-20 (1968) 
(holding that the "man in the house" rule disqualifying women for AFDC payments 
based on unmarried cohabitation bears no relationship to the material needs of 
household) ; United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533-34 (1972) 
(holding that relatedness of household members is irrelevant to members' need for 
food subsidies); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 636 (1974) (holding that the fact 
of being an illegitimate child born after the onset of a parent's disability has no 
bearing on actual dependency and need for benefits). But see C.K. v. Shalala, 883 F. 
Supp. 991, 1014 (D.N.J. 1995) (upholding New Jersey's "family cap" regulation that 
denies any increase in AFDC payments to families for additional children born out of 
wedlock, on the rationale that encouraging responsible and thoughtful reproductive 
decision making is a legitimate "secondary" goal of the statutory design). 
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This analytic method displays a tunnel vision that arbitrarily 
rules out the possibility that a statutory scheme can have multiple, 
or "composite," legislative purposes. Those purposes can be quite 
eclectic: on the one hand, forestalling starvation or destitution; on 
the other, preserving-or at least not subverting-certain relational 
norms of behavior that support larger social patterns and institu-
tions. 
How might the Court have conceived of the purposes of some 
of the statutes at issue in the illegitimacy cases? One commentator 
has suggested goals stated in conditional forms: for example, in Levy 
or Glona, the legislature may have sought "to compensate ... for 
wrongful death . .. to the extent that compensation does not sanction 
relationships that have never been legally form alized ."65 The statu-
tory designs in Levy and Glona appear tailored to that end. Thus, the 
proper question in Levy and Glona was not whe ther the statutory 
limitations on recovery for illegitimate children accorded with a p re-
selected statutory purpose: those very limitations revealed and 
helped to define that purpose. The only valid question was whether 
the composite purpose was one the state could advance in the man-
ner in which it attempted to do so. 
The Court's refusal to acknowledge that the purpose of the il-
legitimacy statutes might have been a composite of eclectic elements 
also shows a disregard of the realities of "pluralistic" group politics 
in forging legislative goals. Whether from self-interest or because of 
disparate theories of the public good, the constituencies involved in 
shaping the statutes at issue could well have differed in their legis-
lative agendas. 66 With respect to the New Jersey AFWP at issue in 
Cahill, for example, some groups may have been concerned primar-
ily with alleviating poverty and eliminating material want, while 
others were intent on minimizing the perverse behavioral effects that 
65. Aleta Wallach & Patricia Tenoso, A Vindica tion of the Rights of Unmarried Moth-
ers and Their Children: An Analysis of the Ins titution of Illegit imacy, Equal Protection, and 
the Uniform Parentage Act, 23 U. KAN. L. REv. 23, 40 n .76 (1974); see also Carl E. 
Schneider, State Interes t Analysis in Fourteenth Amendment "Privacy " Law: An Essay on 
the Constittliionalization of Social Issues, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 79, 92 (1988) 
(criticizing the Court's equal protection jurisprudence by s ta ting tha t " [p]roblems ... 
also arise when the Court assesses each of a statute's several purposes without con-
sidering the ways in which the legislature must moderate its pursuit of one goal in 
order to serve others as well"); Note, Legislative P11rpose, Rationality, and Equal Pro tec-
tion , 82 YALE L.J. 123 (1972) (commenting that the legislative purpose of the s ta tute in 
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) , was not to make con traceptives available as 
such, but to provide them only to the extent that their availability would not encour-
age premarital sex). 
66. See, e.g., ROBERT A. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS? (1961) ; Sullivan, supra note 17, at 
1468-73 (noting the role of pluralistic interest groups in attaching conditions to gov-
ernment largesse). 
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cash benefits programs might generate. Such concerns are familiar: 
the possibility of detrimental effects on work effort67 or on the will-
ingness to marry before having children.68 It would hardly be 
surprising if the intersection of these agendas produced a compro-
mise that restricted cash benefit eligibility in a manner designed to 
abate some of the adverse consequences of government largesse. The 
question of whether such restrictions would "work"-that is 
whether they would have the intended effects-has some bearing on 
their rationality,69 but raises concerns entirely different from those at 
issue in deciding whether a particular restriction is consistent with 
the legislative purpose . In sum, there is no reason to rule out the 
p ossibility that the ordinary processes of legislative compromise and 
logrolling would issue forth statutory schemes (such as the limita-
tions on benefits program-as in Cahill-or the limitations on a 
judicially enforceable right of recovery-as in the illegitimacy cases) 
with diverse and multiple purposes. 
"Atomism" also infects the Court's judgment of the "rationality" 
of the rules at issue in the illegitimacy cases by distorting its analysis 
of the rules' effectiveness-that is, of whether the state statutes at 
issue will actually work to accomplish the subsidiary goal of dis-
couraging illegitimacy. The Court's main ploy on this point has been 
to treat the entire question of behavioral effect as a lePoal question, 
rather than as an empirical question for social science. 0 Even apart 
from that defect, however, the Court also takes too narrow a view of 
the possible impact of legal rules on social choice. Justice Harlan ad-
umbrates this line of analysis in his dissent in Glona:71 each rule 
should be assessed as part of a broader scheme. The scheme consists 
of a pattern of rules and restrictions, often in diverse areas of the 
law, that work together to support, maintain, or elevate one set of 
social expectations above others. The result amounts to a form of 
67. See SARA. LEVITAN, PROGRAMS IN AID OF THE POOR 136 (1990) (noting a con-
cern with effect of the welfare programs on work effort, and emphasizing the need 
for welfare programs to encourage self-support in addition to providing cash or 
goods and services); LAWRENCE M. MEAD, BEYOND ENTITLEMENT: THE SoCIAL 
OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP 69-90 (1986) (arguing that work must be enforced 
among welfare recipients, as disadvantaged individuals are unlikely to work regu-
larly unless they are required to do so); see also Robert A. Moffitt, The Effect of a 
Negative Income Tax on Work Effort: A Sum man; of the Experimental Results, in WELFARE 
REFORM IN AMERICA: PERSPECTIVES AND PROSPECTS 209-29 (Paul M. Sommers ed. , 
1982) (providing results of experiments showing that the negative income tax re-
duces work effort). 
68. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
69. See infra note 156 and accompanying text (discussing efficacy). 
70. See infra note 119 and accompanying text. 
71. Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 76-82 (1968) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting). 
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legal synergy in which the whole is more than the sum of its parts. 7=' 
The influence of each part of the scheme cannot be readily teased 
out, measured, assessed, or demonstrated. Laws work together. Each 
rule might plausibly be considered "irrational" if scrutinized in iso-
lation; but if every rule were subject to that treatment in turn, the 
entire structure would collapse.73 Yet the Court takes virtually no 
account of the dynamics of legal synergy, in which each piece makes 
its contribution to maintaining the structure as a whole. 
In a much broader sense as well, the cases ignore the interaction 
of the legal whole with the social reality in the form of "extralegal" 
social forces, practices, conventions, and taboos. That interaction is 
in part symbolic. Normative expectations or moral conventions, al-
though potentially influenced by law, are not wholly creatures of the 
legal regime. Rather, behavioral conventions bear a m ore complex 
relationship to forces external to those conventions, such as legal re-
strictions or material incentives. Social expectation and "social 
meaning" are of critical importance to the maintenance of norms. 74 
This observation is especially relevant to a decision to enact statutes 
like those in Cahill: if the government provides the funds to support 
people who happen to live together in certain arrangements, then 
the government can be seen as, in some respect, "subsidizing" those 
arrangements. That subsidy sends a message of acceptance, and can 
be taken as signaling that a way of life is in the public interest (or at 
least not against it). Since the government usually subsidizes what it 
supports and wishes to encourage, it is not surprising that benefits 
programs can be perceived as placing a stamp of approval on cir-
cumstances that trigger eligibility. This is especially so when 
eligibility is restrictive-as it is under AFDC-so that some types of 
families are actually excluded from a program. 
The Cahill case illustrates another important respect in which 
considering a statute out of context can result in a distorted picture 
72. See id. 
73. Carl Schneider has made a similar point with respect to some of the Court's 
family Jaw and privacy cases, such as Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1 972), and 
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) . He faults the Court for "examining each stat-
ute in isolation, asking only how important its particular prohibition is and whether 
the s ta tute effectuates that prohibition." Schneider, supra note 65, at 99. He suggests 
that the importance of a prohibition should be viewed as depending on " the larger 
socializing scheme," id. , which includes not just social practices and institutions, but 
also " the whole set of statutes." Id. ; see also Carl E. Schneider, The Channelling Function 
in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 495 (1992) ; Bruce C. Hafen, The Constitutional 
Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexu.al Privacy-Balancing the Individual and Social In-
terests , 81 MICH. L. REv. 463 (1983) . 
74. See Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U . CHL L. REv. 943, 
956 (1 995); Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 903 
(1996); see also infra Part II.A.2. 
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of its intent and effect. There, the Court not only ignored the issue of 
how the AFWP might work together with other laws and practices 
designed to buttress traditional family life, but it also failed to con-
sider how the statute fit together with the federal AFDC program, 
which operated simultaneously and was thought by some to con-
tribute to the breakdown of the two-parent family among the poor. 
Even accepting that the purpose of the AFWP was to favor the 
traditional two-parent family, the statute setting up the program 
seems to draw some quite arbitrary and question-begging distinc-
tions. For example, it excludes two-parent families consisting of 
remarried spouses and their children if the children are unavailable 
for adoption by the stepparent (presumably because the parent left 
behind will not relinquish parental rights), but includes similar 
families where the children are available to be adopted. A similar 
disparity exists for families consisting of a former single mother 
married to a man who is not the natural father of her illegitimate 
children. The children may or may not be available for adoption by 
her new husband . 
The AFWP did not stand alone, however. The statute makes 
quite a bit more sense when considered as a supplement to AFDC-
and one designed to neutralize some of the undesirable behavioral 
effects often attributed to the federal program. The key is that the 
AFWP dovetails almost precisely with AFDC: families eligible for 
AFWP include just those families excluded from AFDC, and vice 
versa (with one notable exception discussed below). 
Although AFDC covers poor families with children and one 
parent "absent," it is available to some married and cohabiting cou-
ples. Intact stepparent families retain AFDC eligibility as long as the 
stepparent is not legally responsible for the children of the other 
parent. Likewise, after the demise of the "man in the house" rule,75 a 
woman retains AFDC benefits if she is cohabiting with a man who is 
not the natural father of her children. AFDC is unavailable, however, 
if the stepparent of a legitimate or illegitimate child becomes a le-
gally responsible parent by adopting his spouse's children. 
Likewise, if a cohabiting man marries his girlfriend and adopts her 
children, AFDC is unavailable. AFWP covers poor families that fit 
those disqualifying patterns, thus removing disincentives to adop-
tion and/ or marriage under those circumstances. Finally, AFDC is 
unavailable if two natural parents are present in the horne, whether 
75. See King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 318-20 (1 968) (holding that a state eligibility 
rule under the AFDC program that disqualified unmarried women who engaged in 
sexual cohabitation from receiving benefits-known as the "man in the house" 
rule-was invalid because cohabitation bears no relationship to the material needs of 
the household). 
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or not they are married. The AFWP offers a pos1hve incentive for 
parents in such a circumstance to marry, since marriage will allow 
the family to receive state AFWP payments (which would be un-
available if they lived together without marrying) . 
Thus, if the Court in Cahill had surveyed the entire legal land-
scape, it would have realized that the New Jersey program was best 
regarded as a quite rational attempt to counteract some of the per-
verse incentives created by AFDC, rather than an effort to single out 
illegitimate children for unfavorable treatment. Indeed, it could be 
argued that the scheme aimed to improve the lot of children born 
out of wedlock by eliminating artificial disincentives-created by the 
design of AFDC-to the adoption and "legitimation" of children 
who had been wholly deprived of the support of one (natural) par-
ent. Illegitimate children who were not adopted could still receive 
benefits under the federal program.76 
In sum, the Court's illegitimacy jurisprudence in general-and 
its decision in Cahill in particular-are marked by a disregard of the 
legal and social setting in which the law operates. The cases con-
template a social world devoid of mediating structures, institutions, 
or conventions. Since there are no significant extralegal social forces 
at work, there need be no theory of how changes in the law might 
buttress or erode those forces . In this impoverished universe, the law 
can be expected to have a direct and unmediated effect on discrete 
individuals. The conduct the law seeks to regulate-such as out-of-
wedlock childbearing-can be treated as a one-shot phenomenon, 
with antecedents and effects measured one child and one parent at a 
time.77 This atomistic approach lends a distinct air of unreality to the 
Court's decisions, because out-of-wedlock childbearing is an area in 
which normative expectations can be expected to play an important 
role in shaping people's behavior. 
76. If the Court had looked even more closely, however, the statute might not 
have survived after all. Shortly after the enactment of the New Jersey program, a 
proposal was made for its repeal on the ground that its effect on marriage and family 
formation was exactly the opposi te of what was desired. The AFWP did not replace 
the federal-state AFDC program, but it did replace the federal AFDC-U program, 
which provided cash benefits to two-parent famili es with an unemployed primary 
breadwinner. Because the benefits offered under the AFWP were significantly less 
generous than those available under AFDC to a family of comparable size, and also 
less generous than the benefits that previously had been available under the AFDC-U 
program, the New Jersey program actually increased the incentive for poor families 
in New Jersey to break up. See Hearing on Assembly Bill No. 1201 Before the New Jersey 
Assembly Institutions and Welfare Comm . 1-6 (1972) (copy on fil e with author). 
77. In the illegitimacy cases, that framework is taken even to the point of implying 
that the justification for a particular child's sacrifice should be tested by its behav-
ioral effect on his parent alone. See, e.g., Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. , 406 U.S. 164 
(1972) (stating that "penalizing the illegitimate child is an ineffectual-as well as un-
just-way of deterring the parent"). 
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2. The Disregard of Norms 
Individuals act under others' influence, and they care what oth-
ers think. More broadly, they are members of complex societies in 
which standards and exoectations for conduct are an ineluctable fea-, 
ture of social and cultural life-a fact amply substantiated by 
sociologists, sociobiologists, and anthropologists studying a spec-
trum of cultures. This is not the place for a comprehensive 
exposition of the source and operation of moral and cultural 
norms-an issue that I and others have discussed elsewhere.78 Suffice 
it to say that, traditionally and historically, sexuality, family rela-
tions, and marriage have been highly "normalized" areas of human 
existence in which moralism abounds, social expectations are often 
highly defined, conformity is expected, deviance is punished by so-
cial sanctions imposed by the group, and conformity is enforced 
through fear of rejection or loss of standing within the group.79 
We have described how the Court's illegitimacy jurisprudence 
virtually ignores the dynamics of social norms that have evolved to 
regulate human sexuality. As a consequence, it is not surprising that 
the case discussions take little account of how individual behavior in 
the social setting is influenced by how others behave or by the inci-
dence and prevalence of behavioral patterns. As we have seen, the 
Court asks whether the law makes sense based on how that law-
and that law alone-will affect a single woman's decision-making 
process. This approach-which considers the effect of the law on one 
woman's decision and of one woman's decision on society-cannot 
help but influence the assessment of the magnitude of society' s in-
terest. 
The problem with the Court's way of framing the inquiry is that 
the significance of an individual ' s conduct for society as a whole is 
78. See AmyL. Wax, Aga inst Nature-On Robert Wright's The Moral Animal, 63 U. 
CHI. L. REv. 307 (1996) (book review). The legal academy has seen a recent flowering 
of interest in the nature of informal social norms and their role in shaping social 
expectations, behavior, and responses to legal change. See, e.g., Lessig, supra note 74; 
Sunstein, supra note 74; see also Dan M. Kahan, Wh at Do Alternative Sanctions Mean? , 
63 U. CHI. L. REv. 591 (1996) ; Richard H. Pildes, The Destruction of Social Capital 
Through Law, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 2055 (1996). See generally Symposium, Law, 
Economics, Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1643 (1996). There has been relatively little 
attention paid in this literature to the role of norms that regulate marital and 
childbearing behavior or to the ways in which judges and policymakers should take 
cognizance of extralegal, collective forces in these areas. Cf. Wax, supra, at 341-54 
(analyzing the interplay of welfare policy and law with norms that control 
reproductive behavior and family formation) ; see also Sunstein, supra note 74, at 953 
n.188 (briefly noting "controversial ... governmental efforts to stigmatize unwed 
parenthood") . 
79. See Wax, supra note 78, at 341-59. 
.,... 
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not only a matter of the immediate consequences following from 
that act considered in isolation. There are two ways in which indi-
vidual choices that are seemingly inconsequential or minimally 
"harmful" can have detrimental social effects that might warrant 
governmental action. First, society's ability to absorb the effects of a 
particular instance of behavior is often a function of its prevalence. 
Societies may barely feel the consequences of deviant conduct when 
the conduct is rare, but will experience severe strain as it becomes 
more common. A single drunk is of far less concern than a nation of 
drunks, and has far less impact on the social fabric. 80 A twenty-five 
percent illegitimacy rate has far more serious-and very different-
81 consequences than a two percent rate. 
Second, the adverse consequences of behaviors can go beyond 
the burdens of simply dealing with a larger number of individual 
acts alone. Relatively small changes in patterns of conformity to 
normative expectations can have disproportionately large effects. 
The strength of a social convention is often not a simple linear func-
tion of the number of people adhering to it. Some norms are fragile 
because a small increase in nonconformity can lend accelerating 
momentum to the erosion of social practices.82 One reason for this is 
that it is easier to assimilate people to a model of behavior when 
most people exemplify that behavior. As previously unacceptable 
behaviors become more common, policing the norms that hold those 
behaviors at bay becomes more costly to society as a whole. As non-
conformists are counted in greater numbers among friends, relatives, 
80. As Sir Patrick Devlin observes in The Enforcement of Morals, conduct that can be 
harmless, or only minimally harmful, in isolation can have more serious effects when 
indulged in by a large number of people: 
You may argue that if a man's sins affect only himself it cannot be the con-
cern of society. If he chooses to get drunk every night in the privacy of his 
own home, is any one except himself the worse for it? But suppose a quarter 
or a half of the population got drunk every night, what sort of society would 
it be? You cannot set a theoretical limit to the number of people who can get 
drunk before society is entitled to legislate against drunkenness. 
SIR PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 15 (1970). For additional discus-
sion of social harms and the incidence of behaviors, see FRED R. BERGER, HAPPINESS, 
JUSTICE, AND FREEDOM: THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN STUART 
MILL 260-64 (1984); 1 }OEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: 
HARM TO OTHERS 193 (1984) (discussing "specific instances of generally harmful 
activities" as being "sometimes themselves quite harmless"); see also id. at 226 ("Some 
types of behavior are harmful if widely done, harmless if done by only a few."). 
81. For a discussion of harms and illegitimacy, see infra Part III.A. 
82. In his discussion of norm changes, Sunstein acknowledges the existence of 
these patterns. He labels the changing patterns of behavior that initiate modifications 
of norms "norm bandwagons" and the accelerating shifts in norms that can result 
from even minor behavioral changes "norm cascades." See Sunstein, supra note 74, at 
909 . 
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or business associates, conformists find it harder to disapprove of 
"deviance" and to act on the disapproval, further weakening sanc-
tions for violations. The social stigma attached to previously 
unacceptable behaviors progressively abates, making it ever easier 
for individuals to defy expectations. Conduct once deemed socially 
deviant comes to be regarded as more normal and acceptable.83 The 
erosion of norms thus accelerates, moving towards a kind of norma-
tive "tipping"s.f.oint, which can radically alter social patterns over 
the long term. The accelerating erosion of norms is a special danger 
in the areas of sexual and reproductive behavior, where conformity 
to moral conventions and expectations requires that people constrain 
strong natural impulses. As nonconforming conduct becomes more 
common, not only does society lose its capacity to absorb whatever 
adverse effects are generated by nonconformity, but its power to 
discourage and limit nonconformity also drains away. 
Ignoring the ways in which relatively small changes in social 
patterns of conduct can subvert attitudes and expectations inevitably 
leads courts to discount the government's interest in preventing cer-
tain behaviors. It also makes it easier for the courts to ignore 
whatever concrete harms might flow from the conduct that is sought 
to be deterred, on the theory that the law will have, at most, a mar-
ginal effect on a few individuals-an effect that will easily be 
83. See Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Defining Deviancy Down , 62 AM. SCHOLAR 17 
(Winter 1993). For an extended discussion of why people respond to social norms 
and how the maintenance of social norms is sensitive to the balance of conformity 
and deviance, see Wax, supra note 78. 
84. Social scientists have observed that a number of social phenomena are marked 
by a nonlinear relationship between one or more factors that influence behavior and 
the behavior itself. The pattern produced by the nonlinear relationship is sometimes 
described as an "epidemic," because, in a medical epidemic, the pace at which a dis-
ease spreads accelerates as its incidence increases. Epidemic phenomena are often 
marked by a "tipping point" at which a small additional change in a causative factor 
can lead to a huge and catastrophic change in observed effects. The sociologist Tho-
mas Schelling has argued that so-called "white flight," or the tendency of Whites to 
move out when minorities in a neighborhood reach a certain percentage of the 
population, is an example of the tipping phenomenon. See, e.g. , T.C. Schelling, A 
Process of Residential Segregation: Neighborhood Tipping, in RACIAL DISCRlMJNATION IN 
ECONOMIC LIFE (A. Pascal ed., 1972); T.C. Schelling, Dynamic Models of Segregation, 1 
J. MATHEMATICAL Soc. 143 (1971); see also Jonathan Crane, The Epidemic Theory of 
Ghettos and Neighborhood Effects on Dropping Out and Teenage Childbearing, 96 AM. J. 
SOc. 1226-59 (Mar. 1991) (describing nonlinear relationship between factors influenc-
ing social deviance in inner-city neighborhoods and the prevalence of those 
behaviors); David C. Rowe et al., An "Epidemic" Model of Sexual Intercourse Preva-
lences for Black and White Adolescents, 36 SOC. BIOLOGY 127-45 (Fall/Winter 1989) 
(suggesting that the practice of early intercourse among teenagers in a community or 
social group accelerates rapidly once the number of teens who are sexually active 
passes a threshold point); Malcolm Gladwell, The Tipping Point, NEW YORKER, June 3, 
1996, at 36. 
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absorbed against the background of the dominant social order, and 
thus will barely be felt by the polity as a whole. 
A more accurate understanding of how behavior is socially 
situated, and how normative and social expectations influence social 
choice, forces behavior to be seen in a new light. To acknowledge the 
existence and importance of social norms is to acknowledge that 
"moral climate" matters-the way one person behaves will influence 
what others do. The dynamic of social norms thus can greatly mag-
nify the impact of seemingly unimportant instances of 
nonconforming behavior. Conduct that previously seemed 
"harmless" and "private" may come to be regarded with less equa-
nimity as it is seen to propagate influence beyond its limited bounds. 
For example, not only might bearing a child out of wedlock visit 
harm upon that child and on others who must deal with that child as 
it grows up, but it might also make it more acceptable to engage in 
that behavior, which will in turn increase the chance that others will 
do so, and that others will be harmed. 
B. Law, Morality, and Illegitimacy-
Or Should Judges Take Account of Norms? 
Why do courts so often ignore or downplay the existence of so-
cial and sexual norms? There are several possible reasons for judicial 
reluctance fully to acknowledge these forces . The first problem with 
social norms is their ambiguous status as ideas and entities. Exactly 
what is a social norm, how do we know it exists, and how do we as-
sess its force or its vulnerability to influence? The problem comes 
down to empirical verification: norms are easy to talk about but hard 
to characterize and measure, presenting thorny problems of proof 
and causation. How does one reliably track the "erosion" of social 
norms or allocate blame (or credit) to one factor among many? The 
task is even more problematic when courts are faced with the pros-
pect of "protecting" vague mediating entities and abstract social 
constructs at the cost of imposing serious disabilities on concrete, 
identifiable individuals. It is not surprising that courts prefer to take 
the safer course of sticking with ordinary principles of individual 
psychology or demanding real proof of actual shifts in behaviors. 
"Norms-talk" is alarming for yet another reason: it threatens to 
validate more extensive state action-and more extensive 
intervention in people 's lives-than could otherwise be justified by 
considering the effects of the conduct alone. By indirectly amplifying 
and multiplying the effects of individual conduct, social norms 
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painfully shrink the zone of "self-regarding" conduct.85 Likewise, 
acknmvledging the reality of social norms magnifies the ways in 
which a seemingly inconsequential loosening of legal rules can affect 
larger patterns of social behavior. It is not implausible to suggest 
that the desire to avoid the far-reaching implications of these 
understandings has had an often unacknowledged influence on 
jurisprudence in the highly moralized area of sexual cond uct and 
has decisively shaped the discourse of judicial decision making in 
areas touching on sexual and reproductive choice. 
Judicial reluctance to grapple with the rea lity and dynamics of 
social convention may also stem from the fear of being drawn into 
conceptually difficult questions regard ing the proper relationship of 
law and morality. To be sure, the Supren1.e Court has never ex-
pressly rejected the legitimacy of "legislating morali ty," and has 
occasionaliy been willing to uphold laws enacted at least partly to 
vindicate the moral judgment of the majority. 36 But the "privacy" 
cases in general-and the illegitimacy cases in particular-leave the 
impression that judges have nevertheless been chary of legislative 
attempts to enshrine moral values or simple normative judgments in 
law without further consequentialist justifica tions. Put another way, 
many cases reveal a mistrust of what William Galston terms 
"intrinsic traditionalism"-the government's decision to legislate on 
the basis of moral judgment alone-and more comfort with what 
Galston terms "functional traditionalism"-which rests its case on 
the asserted links between adherence to moral principles and the 
promotion of concrete social goods (or the prevention of concrete 
harm). 87 All the better if the judicial assessment of benefit or harm is 
one that can be shared by people of widely d iffering beliefs and val-
ues. The quest for such common foundations has deep roots in the 
85. For a further discussion of the remote consequences of ostensibly "self-
regarding" behaviors in the broader context of the harm principle and the philoso-
phy of John Stuart Mill, see infra note 89 and accompanying text. 
86. See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991) (holding that sta te law 
prohibiting total nudity in public places is not unconstitutional in that it furthers a 
substantial government interest in protecting social order and morality); Bowers v. 
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (stating that the majority belief that sodomy is 
immoral is an adequate rationale for upholding a Georgia sodomy statute); Maher v. 
Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (stating that a state legislature can favor normal childbirth 
over abortion); see also King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 320 (1967) (acknowledging a 
state's "general p ower to deal with conduct it regards as immoral, and with the 
problem of illegitimacy," but holding that the state is barred from discouraging out-
of-wedlock childbearing by cutting off AFDC benefits). 
87. See WILLWv! A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PURPOSES 280-81 (1991). The Supreme 
Court's recent decision in Romer v. Evans, 11 6 S. Ct. 1620 (1996) , is in keeping with 
the courts' discomfort with "intrinsic traditionalism" in the form of laws based on 
m oral judgments not grounded in readily identifiable "harm to others." 
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need to identify legitimate sources of legislative authority in our lib-
eral democratic state. 88 
The distinction Galston draws traces its ped igree back to a 
"harm principle" articulated in the work of John Stuart Mill. In On 
Liberty, Mill explained that "[t]he only purpose for which power can 
be righ tfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, 
against his will, is to prevent harm to others .... [H]is own good, 
either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant."89 According to 
this principle, a state's goal in restricting personal liberty is 
"legitimate" only if directed at preventing harm to, or securing the 
well-being of, persons other than the person whose liberty is con-
strained. A complex debate has raged over what properly can be 
included in the category of "harm to others," and over the existence 
88. A number of commentators have noted that the trend toward 
"demoralization" and privatization of family law can be explained in part by an 
"increasingly pluralistic view of American society" and a growing hostility towards 
laws that smack of the forcible imposition of one group's moral code on others. See 
Schneider, supra note 14, at 1840 (The pluralistic view is "[o]ne explanation of the 
law's fondness for Mill. ... Pluralism has strengthened the trend by inhibiting soci-
ety's impulse to impose its moral principles on discrete groups within society and by 
nurturing a relativistic view of moral principles."); see also Singer, supra note 14 
(documenting the tendency to discount moral justifications for constraining individ-
ual choice, preference, and desire, in laws concerning sexuality and marriage). 
Defending this pluralistic view, one commentator has recently argued that 
legislation seeking to enshrine an unshared moral vision of proper conduct is an 
undemocratic, tyrarmical form of "naked preference," and that imposition of the 
moral values of the majority on a minority through law is an illegitimate exercise of 
the power of the majority. Like an unadorned preference for one group of citizens 
over another, the author argues, a legislative preference for one set of moral princi-
ples cannot, without more, serve as a legitimate state purpose. See Steven G. Gey, Is 
Moral Relativism a Constitutional Command?, 70 IND. L.J. 331 (1995); see also Cass R. 
Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1689 (1984) 
(discussing policies reflecting otherwise unjustified preferences of the majority); cf. 
Gey, supra, at 343 (discussing Robert Bark's and others' advocacy of the position that 
majority rule can legitimately and freely be imposed "over every major aspect of 
social policy," including "the moral and aesthetic environment"). 
For a general discussion of the question whether advancing the majority's 
moral views constitutes a "legitimate state interest," see DEVLIN, supra note 80; 
RICHARD A. WASSERSTROM, MORA.LITY AND THE LAW (1971); Steve Sheppard, The 
State Interest in the Good Citizen: Constitt1tional Balance Between the Citizen and the Per-
fectionist State, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 969 (1994); Thomas Nagel, Moral Conflict and Political 
Legitimacy, 16 PHIL & PUB. AFF. 215 (1987). Nagel draws "a distinction between two 
kinds of disagreement-one whose grounds make it all right for the majority to use 
political power in the service of their opinion, and another whose grounds are such 
that it would be wrong for the majority to do so." Id. at 231. He defends the position 
that governmental action in a liberal state should rest on "generally accessible" ar-
guments and grounds, rather than on moral or religious conceptions shared only by 
a few. Id .; cf KENT GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS 72-84 
(1994) (discussing Nagel's theory and questioning whether democratic states are 
limited to "accessible grounds" to justify actions). 
89. JOHN STUA.t'\T MILL, ON LIBERTY 72 (1978). 
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and reach of the category of "self-regarding" conduct. Although 
some of Mill's critics have asserted that the fact that conduct is re-
garded by some as immoral can itself establish actionable social 
harm,90 others have taken the position that the justification for state 
coercion must be cashed out in terms that go beyond a simple asser-
tion of the "rightness" of society's moral judgment, since otherwise 
the justification simply threatens to swallow the rule.91 
The Court 's jurisprudence in the areas of reproduction, sexual 
privacy rights, and illegitimacy appears to have been influenced-if 
not actively informed-by some version of Mill's idea of the division 
between self-regarding and public conduct.92 As noted, the Supreme 
Court has expressly stated on more than one occasion that moral 
judgments, without further consequentialist justification, can stand 
as a legitimate basis for legislative action. 93 There are some contexts, 
however, in which the Court betrays its uneasiness with this vie·w. 
The discomfort sometimes takes the form of ignoring the fact of 
those judgments altogether.94 At other times, it leads the Court to 
come up with a host of reasons why it cannot give effect to legisla-
tion that expresses society's collective moral stance.95 But perhaps 
the most important way in which the Court betrays its implicit at-
traction to the Millian vision is by displaying a perverse blindness to 
90. See DEVLIN, supra note 80; }AMES STEPHENS, LIBERTY, EQUALITY, FRATERNITY 
(1873); see also FEINBERG, sttpra note 80, at 3-150 (discussing various versions of the 
position that societies have authority to guard against erosion of an integrated sys-
tem of moral norms); BERGER, supra note 80, at 260-75 (discussing Devlin's 
conservative views). 
91. See, e.g., C.L. TEN, MILL ON LIBERTY 20-30 (1980). 
92. See Jed Rubenfeld, The Right to Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 756 & n.108 
(1989) ("American jurisprudence has had a long flirtation with [Mill's] simple but 
revolutionary idea. Several commentators have explicitly invoked the harm principle 
as the basis for a right to privacy.") (citations omitted). But st:e Tom Grey, Eros, Civili-
zation and the Burger Court, 43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 84, 88 (1980) (disagreeing 
with the academic consensus that Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 US 479 (1965), 
"marked the first step in the constitutionalization of some contemporary version of 
John Stuart Mill's principle of liberty," and suggesting instead that the Court's pri-
vacy cases are motivated by "dedicat[ion] to the cause of social stability through the 
reinforcement of traditional institutions and have nothing to do with the sexual lib-
eration of the individual") ; see also id. at 87 (observing that " the [Supreme] Court has 
been of two minds in the areas of sex and the family-divided between the tradi-
tionalist viewpoint expressed in Griswold on the one hand, and a modem, rationalist, 
individualist outlook reflecting the perspective of J.S. Mill"). 
93. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
94. See, e.g., Schneider, supra note 14, at 1863-70 (noting the Roe v. Wade Court's 
failure to discuss the possibility that the Texas abortion statute at issue in that case 
expressed the state's specific moral opposition to the destruction of fetal life). 
95. See infra Part II .C (discussing illegitimacy cases). 
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the quite detrimental consequences of certain "private" sexual be-
haviors.96 
Of course, Mill's famous formulation-which bars government 
regulations for persons' "own good" but not for the good of soci-
ety-depends on the existence of a significant category of "self-
regarding" conduct that has no appreciable social consequences and 
that causes no significant harm to others. Although the concept of 
areas thought properly subject only to private preference has ex-
panded,97 the vision of persons in their splendid isolation can often 
be maintained only at the cost of doing violence to an accurate pic-
ture of social reality. Defenders of Mill are increasingly forced back 
on a qualified version of the harm principle (which Fred Berger has 
called the "strong liberal" position) that allows the government to act 
only on "strong evidence that engaging in the suspect behavior leads 
a high percentage of people to do very bad things" and when it is 
"extremely likely that government intervention can adequately deal 
with the ... tide of abuse." As Berger observes, that position must 
leave society "inadequately equipped to protect itself from insidious 
harm that is the upshot of a chain of influences that begins with con-
duct that, viewed out of that context, appears to harm only the 
agent."98 
The Court's attraction to the Millian paradigm is understand-
able. If the idea of a distinction between "private" behavior and 
behavior with which the public may rightly be concerned has, how-
ever indirectly, shaped judicial decision making, that is not because 
it is especially coherent or because it actually fits the facts, but be-
cause the alternative is frightening to the prospect of human 
freedom. The same set of concerns must also have a role in the 
courts' (admittedly erratic) reluctance to take moral judgments as 
conclusive of governmental authority on questions related to sexual 
privacy. As Lord Patrick Devlin has stated, any theory of harm, or of 
the relation of law to morals, must reckon with the strong conviction 
that a society cannot call itself free if it expects the individual to 
96. Id. 
97. See, e.g., Singer, supra note 14. 
98. BERGER, supra note 80, at 264; see also id. at 260 ("The conservative foresees a 
train of events, perhaps a complex process, of which the (apparently) self-regarding 
acts are an early stage."). For other critiques of the "strong liberal's" narrow view of 
Mill's category of "self-regarding" conduct, see TEN, supra note 91, at 86 (noting that 
"[a] persistent criticism of Mill's liberty principle is its alleged failure to recognize 
that there are certain important social structures and institutions which a society is 
justified in protecting even at the cost of coercing individuals whose conduct threat-
ens to undermine them"); Rubenfeld, supra note 92, at 756-57 (arguing that conduct 
can be considered "self-regarding" only by arbitrarily discounting certain forms of 
indirect, speculative, or emotional harm). 
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"surrender to the judgment of society the whole conduct of his life."99 
That surrender has already largely transpired in the sphere of eco-
nomic rights. The courts long ago abandoned a commitment to 
economic self-determination as the bastion of freedom because they 
could no longer turn a blind eye to the baleful social effects of os-
tensibly "private" choices. 100 Sexual self-determination has not 
suffered the same fate yet, perhaps, in part, because it is seen as one 
of the last remaining redoubts of individual autonomy in the wake 
of the explosion of governmental regulation following the repudia-
tion of Lochner. 101 That some aspects of sexual conduct and 
reproductive choice are, in important respects, "private," has hard-
ened into a jurisprudential convention dissociated from any 
completely sound. grounding in the harm principle. As I will argue 
below, any attempt to characterize the decision to bear a child out of 
wedlock as purely "private"-in the sense of "self-regarding"-
stands in defiance of the evidence,102 and thus must implicate a fun-
damentally arbitrary division. To maintain that division, it is 
necessary to resist the post-Lochner parallel: the recognition that pri-
vate choices in the sphere of sexuality and reproduction-like those 
in business and commerce-can generate detrimental social 
"externalities." A more honest course is to assert that, when it comes 
to some areas of human life, harm to society's interests must be 
largely disregarded-that individuals must be free to engage in 
some forms of conduct completely free from state interference, re-
gardless of effects. 103 
99. DEVLIN, Stipra note 80, at 15. 
100. See, e.g. , Richard A. Epstein, The Harm Principle-And How It Grew, 45 U. 
TORONTO L.J. 369 (1995) (arguing that an expansion in the types of harmful 
"externalities" that are viewed as resulting from various types of human activity has 
fueled the growth of the regulatory state). My contention (which Epstein does not 
contradict) is that the expansion has been selectively confined to commercial and 
economic activities. There has, if anything, been a contraction in the scope of what 
are considered, for purposes of legitimate public action, the cognizable externalities 
of sexual and reproductive choices. 
101. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (holding that the due process clauses 
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments protect liberty of contract and private 
property against unwarranted government interference); see Cass R. Sunstein, Loch-
ner's LegaCJ), 87 COLUM. L. REv. 873 (1987); cf. Singer, supra note 14, at 1458-65 
(describing how the notion of the family unit as the bastion of private power that 
serves as a counterweight to the state evolved into the recognition of the right of in-
dividuals to make decisions with respect to marriage and sexuality free from 
government interference, even where those decisions undermined the family). 
102. See infra note 139 and accompanying text. 
103. See Singer, st;pra note 14, at 1508-17. 
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C. Law, Morality, and the Supreme Court's 
Illegitimacy Ju risprudence 
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The foregoirtg discussion sheds new light on the Court' s ille-
gitimacy jurisprudence. In grappling with distinctions based on 
illegitimacy, the Court has operated in a constricted domain. Al-
though it has never expressly denied that society has a valid interest 
in discouraging illegitimate births, the Court strives to sidestep the 
consequences of that interest. Although it acknowledges society's 
traditional condemnation "through the ages . .. of irresponsible liai-
sons beyond the bonds of marriage," 104 it avoids confronting head-on 
the difficult issues raised by the existence of longstanding moral dis-
approval. The Court not only makes light of the purely moral 
grounds for the laws at issue, but also devotes virtually no attention 
to the m ore concrete or consequentialist grounds based on harm to 
others. Nor does it give any serious consideration to whether such 
concerns would amount to a "legitimate state interest" in discourag-
ing out-of-wedlock births. Rather, the Court consistently concludes 
that no harm will be forthcoming from invalidating the rules at issue 
because they can be expected to have little impact on ordinary peo-
ple. It thus avoids examining the effects of out-of-wedlock 
childbearing or considering whether liberty interests outweigh 
whatever harm is generated. 
Instead, the Court declares the laws "irrational," "illogical," and 
"unjust." 105 In a number of cases, the measure at issue-whether a 
bar to recovery of workman's compensation,106 or for wrongful 
death,107 or of support from the natural father108-is deemed 
"irrational" based on the conclusion that it is an ineffective means of 
advancing whatever "legi timate" purpose the government might 
have. A measure of the Court's eagerness to avoid the hard ques-
tions is its acceptance, under the guise of a principle of constitutional 
law, of an essentially empirical proposition-that no person would 
ever be influenced by the presence of such laws in the desired direc-
tion. As already discussed, the Court's reasoning assumes that the 
influence must be direct, apparent, and immediate. It discounts or 
disregards the possibility of long-term trends mediated by a shift in 
104. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972), quoted in New Jersey 
Welfare Rights Org. v . Cahill , 411 U.S. 619,620 (1973). 
105. See, e.g. , New Jersey Welfare Rights, 411 U.S. at 620; Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 
535,538 (1973); Weber, 406 U.S. a t 175; Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68,72 (1968). 
106. See Weber, 406 U.S. a t 165. 
107. See Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins . Co., 391 U.S. 73, 73-74 (1968); Levy, 
391 U.S. at 70. 
108. See Gomez, 409 U.S. at 535. 
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the "moral climate." In this respect, the Court reveals its individual-
ist bent most strongly-an outlook it shares with a robust version of 
Mill 's harm principle, which focuses on the individual both as cause 
and effect of actionable consequences. On this view, the test of 
whether the state should be concerned with conduct is primarily 
w hether an isolated individual 's action or choice has any concrete 
and measurable effect on other persons. 109 Delayed or complex ef-
fec ts on the long-term vitality of institutions and norms are left out 
of the equation. 
Of course, the Court has also stated-most prominently in the 
later illegitimacy cases-that it is "illogical and unjust" to "deny [] ... 
an essentia~ right to a child" or otherwise to R0ena~ize that child b~sed on the cho1ces and conduct of h1s parents. It 1s unclear prec1sely 
what the Court m eans by "illogical." As already suggested, 111 this 
may be a variation on the them e tha t the differential treatment man-
d ated by the statutory design "won't work." If the point is that the 
sanction (which falls on the individual child) does not run to the 
p ersons whose conduct generates the problem (his parents), the 
point is irrefutable but narrow. The problem is that this point of 
view discounts the collective, prospective, and cumulative effects of 
disadvantages running to illegitimate children as a whole. The par-
ents of the particular child at issue might not be deterred by the 
prospect of the sanction being visited on their child-and, of course, 
they cannot be deterred retroactively once it is visited! But that does 
not m ean that a sanction, in concert with other sanctions and signals, 
might not have some influence on persons within a community who 
are contemplating becoming parents in the future . 
The Court ultimately falls back on the conclusion that these 
sanctions are "unjust." The argument is that it is fundamentally un-
fair-that is, contrary to some fundamental (and perhaps 
constitutional) principle of justice-to "visit the sins of the father 
upon the sons."112 This suggests that setting up rules that disadvan-
tage children born out of wedlock may be an impermissible way to 
try to reduce out-of-wedlock births because the disability is directed 
at p ersons who cannot respond to the incentives created. That un-
fairness would attach regardless of whether the technique of trying 
to influence the parents through the child actually worked . 
109. See supra note 80 and sources cited therein. 
110. See Gomez, 409 U.S. at 538; New Jersey Welfare Righ ts, 411 U.S. at 620 (quoting 
Weber, 406 U.S. at 175); see also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220 (1982). 
111 . See supra notes 105-08 & 110 and accompanying text. 
112. For an interesting discussion of the "sins of the fathers" concept in law, see 
Max Stier, Note, Corrup tion of Blood and Equal Protection: Why the Sins of the Parents 
Should Not Matter , 44 STAN. L. REv. 727 (1992). 
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I do not purport to offer a full analysis of the "injustice" ration-
ale or of whether it can carry the full weight of the decisions in the 
illegitimacy cases. 113 Several observations are in order, however. Se-
rious questions can be raised about the origin and vitality of this 
principle of "fairness," and about possible limits to its application. 
This principle makes a passing appearance as a constraint on legis-
lative power in a number of contexts, but it bears a decision's full 
weight only in cases implicating the constitutional provision dealing 
with punishments for treason. 114 If taken seriously, the principle has 
far-reaching implications for the validity of a host of legislative 
measures that, although ostensibly directed at adults, have a sub-
stantial effect on children. 115 But if we accept that there are 
limitations on what the government can do to children directly to 
get at their parents' behavior, our intuition suggests that those limi-
tations are strongest vvhen the measures at issue are direct, punitive, 
and focused, rather than indirect, monetary, and mixed in effect. The 
statute at issue in Cahill arguably possesses the latter attributes, as its 
effects on illegitimate children are secondary to its effects on adult 
conduct and on the family unit as a whole. It is uncertain what force, 
if any, the "sins of the fathers" principle should have when evaluat-
ing programs structured along similar lines. 
III. SHOULD THE GOVERNMENT "DEFUND" ILLEGITIMACY? 
The Court's "fundamental rights" jurisprudence in the area of 
sexual privacy has been useful in dealing with the unsettling 
implications of taking the "harm" principle seriously. There is no 
113. The issue of the status of what I would term "transgenerational sanctions"-
and their relation to the very idea of the family as a functioning unit-is a question 
beyond the scope of this article, but one which I hope to address at a later point. For 
a contrarian approach, see Daniel Lapin, Ostracism and Disgrace in the Maintenance of 
a Precarious Social Order, in THIS WILL HURT, THE RESTORATION OF VIRTUE & CIVIC 
ORDER 77, 84 (Digby Anderson ed., 1995) (defending the stigma that attaches to chil-
dren born out of wedlock by observing that "[e]ven in an egalitarian society, we 
know that our positive achievements and our monetary success benefit our children. 
Why should we expect that our sins will not harm them?"). For a different view, see 
Sandra Guerra, Family Values? The Family As an Innocent Victim of Civil Drug Asset 
Forfeiture, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 343 (1996). 
114. See Stier, supra note 112, at 732-33 (discussing the corruption of blood and bill 
of attainder provisions of the United States Constitution); id. at 733, 734, 741, 743 
(documenting the invocation of the "sins of the fathers" principle in the Supreme 
Court's opinions in King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1967); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 
(1982); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977); and Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 
(1979); and in the Fifth Circuit's decision in St. Ann v. Palisi, 495 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 
1974)). 
115. See Stier, supra note 112, at 735 n.61, 752-53 (discussing the argument that the 
"sins of the fathers" principle "proves too much"). 
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end to what can be justified if our aim is to forestall a host of 
perceived or potential harms by shoring up social norms in the area 
of reproductive choice. Coercion of the most blatant kind would be 
permitted. Yet, few would seriously question that there are some 
significant limits on the government's power to tell us when and 
whom to marry, or to penalize persons for bringing children into the 
world under less than optimal circumstances. The freedom from 
direct government interference with the choice to marry or bear 
children through outright proscription or direct penalty now 
receives protection as an essential component of "negative liberty." 
In such cases, the harm principle is either virtually ignored, or the 
potential harms to society from the conduct in question are 
imp lici tly deemed outweighed. 116 
Nevertheless, the courts are still unwilling to bar the govern-
m ent from all attempts to influence the incidence of potentially 
harmful conduct that might involve the exercise of "fundamental 
rights." The question of what kinds of incentives and disincentives 
the government can create through exercise of the spending power is 
properly part of the broader problem of unconstitutional condi-
tions, 117 and this article does not purport to take on the vexed 
question of whether and when conditions on spending or subsidiza-
tion can be acceptable where direct penalties with the same aims are 
not. 11 8 The problematic status of such conditions, however, frames 
our remaining analysis of welfare programs, like the one in Cahill, 
that attempt to shore up traditional family forms. Specifically, an 
awareness of the doctrinal difficulties might lead us to prefer pro-
grams that do not raise the specter of unconstitutional conditions. If 
we assume that our purpose is, at the least, to refrain from discour-
aging childbearing in two-parent families-and, at best, to 
encourage people to choose that setting for bearing children-then 
prudence alone prompts us to ask whether that purpose can be 
116. The Supreme Court's illegitimacy cases do not precisely fit the paradigm of a 
direct or criminal prohibition on "priva te" reproductive choice. Rather, they involve 
sta te laws that afford illegi timate children and their parents fewer common law 
rights than those enjoyed by legitimate children and their paren ts. Instead of viewing 
the cases as presenting possible violations of fundamental rights, the Court analyzes 
them under the equal protection guarantee. It is in this context that the Court down-
p lays the potential harms offered up by the state to justify discriminatory treatment, 
and finds those harms variously insufficient to overcome other interests. 
117. See supra note 17. The question of the limits of the government's freedom to 
ac t by indirection-by creating incentives and disincentives through the manipula-
tion of government expenditures-is a central concern of the doctrine of 
unconstitutional conditions and the jurisprudence of government "subsidiza tion." 
See id.; see also Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 
(1980). 
118. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
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accomplished just as well with programs that do not "burden" mari-
tal or reproductive decision making in any objectionable way as 
with those that do. To that purpose, I discuss below the possibility of 
constructing so-called "neutral" options for cash benefit programs 
directed at the poor. I then compare such programs to proposals for 
direct subsidization of traditional families. Before proceeding to that 
analysis, however, it is necessary to examine more closely the ques-
tion of the state's interest in seeing that its citizens make (or do not 
make) certain types of reproductive choices. It is to that issue I now 
turn. 
A. Is Out-of-Wedlock Childbearing "Harmful"? 
Even if we accept that harm to others justifies some kinds of 
state interference with conduct, we must still consider whether out-
of-wedlock childbearing does harm. There is a growing body of 
social science evidence that indicates that being raised without two 
parents reduces a child 's capacity to become an independent and 
contributing member of the community. 119 Children in single-parent 
families more often live in poverty than children born and / or raised 
in two-parent families. 120 But the claimed harms go beyond simple 
poverty: even controlling for socioeconomic status, there is at least 
some solid evidence that children of single parents do less well in 
school, complete fewer years of schooling, have lower earnings and 
higher rates of unemployment in adulthood, get in trouble with 
119. For the most comprehensive and recent summary of data on the fate of chil-
dren in single-parent families, see Sara S. McLanahan, The Consequences of Non marital 
Childbearing for Women, Children, and Society, in U.S. DEP'T OF H EALTH AND HUMAN 
SERV., PuB. NO. 95-1257, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON OUT-OF-WEDLOCK CHILDBEARING 
229-39 (1995). See also GALSTON, supra note 87, at 280-81; William A. Galston, A Lib-
eral-Democratic Case for the Two-Parent Family , RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY, Winter 1990-
91, at 14, 17 [hereinafter Galston, Liberal-Democratic Case ]. A number of studies sum-
marized in these sources report difficulties for children raised in single-parent 
families formed through extramarital birth as well as through divorce. Although this 
article focuses on extramarital childbearing, see supra note 9, a para llel analysis per-
haps could be conducted for government efforts to discourage divorce. 
120. See MARY NOEL GOUKE & ARUNE MCCLARTY ROLUNS, ONE PARENT 
CHILDREN, THE GROWING MINORITY: A RESEARCH GUIDE (1990); MARGARET B. 
HARGREA YES, LEARNING UNDER STRESS: CHILDREN OF SINGLE PARENTS AND THE 
ScHOOLS (1991); Linda McClain, Irresponsible Reprod11ction, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 339 
(1996) ; Douglas J. Besharov eta!., A Portrait in Black and Whit e: Out-of-Wedlock Births, 
PuB. OPINION, May/June 1987, at 43, 44; IRWIN GARFINKEL & SARA MCLANAHAN, 
SINGLE MOTHERS AND THEIR CHILDREN: A NEW AMERICAN DILEMMA 11-15 (1986); 
SARA MCLANAHAN & GARY D. SANDEFUR, GROWING UP WITH A SINGLE PARENT: 
WHAT HURTS, WHAT HELPS (1994) ; Home Sweet Home, ECONOMIST, Sept. 9, 1995, at 
25, 26-29 (discussing the relationship between father!essness and poverty); Eliza N. 
Carney, Legitimate Questions, 27 NAT'L L.J. 679, 681 (1995). 
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authority more often, have more emotional and health problems, 
and are more likely to become teenage or single parents 
themselves. 12 1 Moreover, growing up in a single-parent family 
significantly enhances the probability that a child (especially a male 
child) will engage in juvenile criminal activity. 122 Illegitimacy has 
also been identified as an independent risk factor for high rates of 
infant mortality. 123 
Thus, children growing up with one parent do less well than 
others. Moreover, they do less well in ways that have an impact on 
the rest of us. Juvenile crime, inadequate educational outcomes, teen 
pregnancy, and poor mental and physical health impose costs on 
persons other than the parents and children directly involved. Be-
cause reducing those costs is a matter of public concern, it follows 
that reducing the number of extramarital births is a legitimate goal 
of government. It would appear, then, that resolving the debate over 
whether the state is justified in taking at least some kinds of steps to 
promote and maintain the two-parent family norm is not just a mat-
ter of answering the hard question of whether and when the state 
may (or should) enforce majoritarian moral judgments. The issue is 
no longer one of so-called "intrinsic traditionalism."m Rather, the 
arguments are of the "functional traditionalist" school, which rests 
its case on the asserted links between concrete social harm and con-
duct that causes the harm, and not on the conduct's inconsistency 
with traditional moral precepts as such. 
The application of the "harm" principle to out-of-wedlock 
childbearing is not entirely unproblematic, however. In addition to 
the unconstitutional conditions problem already noted, a second 
difficulty stems from a conceptual puzzle in the attribution of harm, 
which is known as the "nonidentity problem."125 The "nonidentity" 
121. See McLanahan, supra note 119, at 229-39; see also Galston, Liberal-Democratic 
Case, supra note 119, at 17-19; Home Sweet Home, supra note 120, at 29; DAVID 
BLANKENHORN, FATHERLESS IN AMERICA 25-48 (1995); COUNCIL ON FAMILIES IN 
AMERICA, MARRIAGE IN AMERICA, A REPORT TO THE NATION 5-7 (1995) (summarizing 
studies). 
122. See, e.g., Natalie Angier, Disputed Meeting to Ask if Crime Has Genetic Roots, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1995, at C1, C6 (reporting that the one factor that has been 
identified as highly correlated with criminal activity is the absence of a father in the 
home). 
123. See Nicholas Eberstadt, Why Babies Die in D.C., PUB. INTEREST, Mar. 1994 
(reporting that high infant mortality is correlated with extramarital birth among 
Blacks in the District of Columbia regardless of educational and socioeconomic char-
acteristics). 
124. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
125. See DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 363 (1984) (discussing the 
"nonidentity problem"); see also JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL 
LAW: HARMLESS WRONGDOING 31, 325-28 (discussing the nonidentity problem) 
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problem has recently been described as posing the question of 
whether someone wrongs or "harms" a child "by bringing it into the 
world with some disability, handicap, or disadvantage when the 
disability could only have been prevented either by not reproducing 
at all or by having a different child."126 As applied to out-of-wedlock 
birth, the nonidentity problem is only a problem if a particular child 
has no way to be born or raised free of the objectionable condition of 
his birth. If the only alternative to experiencing the harm of being 
born out of wedlock is for the mother to forgo childbearing or put it 
off, then the alternative for the child is not to be born at all. In such a 
case, preventing harm would mean preventing the birth of the child. 
But it is difficult to argue that a child's interests are protected by 
preventing its existence. Thus, even if being born out of wedlock is 
comparatively undesirable for the child (in that he would be better 
off being born to a married woman) , the event cannot properly be 
regarded as harmful to the child. Indeed, it might be possible 
(although perhaps more strained) to argue that the failure of a child 
to be born because the mother is deterred from having a child out-
side of marriage introduces a new potential harm on the other side 
of the equation-a harm to the child who will never be brought into 
the world. This observation provides a potential counterweight to 
arguments that a high rate of out-of-wedlock childbearing produces 
harms against which the state could act. 
A straightforward application of the classic version of the non-
identity problem to the social problem of out-of-wedlock 
childbearing is too simple. For one thing, the problem as classically 
stated presents too constrained a view of the possibilities contem-
plated by governmental efforts to discourage out-of-wedlock 
childbearing. The philosopher Derek Parfit's original statement of 
the nonidentity problem posed the example of a woman who be-
comes pregnant despite the knowledge that the life-saving 
medication she must take will cause her child to suffer a handicap. 
The background assumption is that the woman cannot live without 
the medication: thus, the only alternative to the birth of the handi-
capped child would be the child's nonexistence. 
But the general run of out-of-wedlock childbearing does not 
present a parallel case because the counterfactual alternatives are not 
so precisely defined as in Parfit's hypothetical. It may well be that, 
as things stand today, the only realistic alternatives that many po-
tential single mothers face to bearing a child outside of marriage are 
indeed forbearance or delay. But to rest with that observation is to 
[hereinafter FEINBERG, HARMLESS WRONGDOING); FEINBERG, supra note 80, at 31 , 103-
04 (same). 
126. Dan W . Brock, Procreative Liberty, 74 TEX. L. REv. 187, 202 (1995) (reviewing 
JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE (1994)). 
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consider the alternatives ceteris paribus in the narrowest sense, with 
other current social realities held constant. That way of thinking fails 
to take into account a collective alternative, or collective hypotheti-
cal counterfactual, to the world in which the pregnant single woman 
currently finds herself. As a general matter, the alternatives com-
monly available to pregnant single women in a particular society are 
a function of the availability and desirability of the option of mar-
riage. The possibility of marriage, both before and after conception, 
as a means to "prevent" extramarital birth is in turn a complex func-
tion of other elements of social convention or moral climate, such as 
attitudes towards and prevalence of out-of-wedlock childbearing, 
the stigma or disabilities attached to single motherhood, the restric-
tiveness of the roles married women are expected to play, the 
comparative burdens customarily placed on them, the sexual avail-
ability of "companionable" females outside of marriage, the 
expectation that a man will marry a woman he impregnates, and the 
social consequences he elicits if he does not. It is at least plausible to 
believe that the availability of government cash grants to single 
mothers might influence--either quite immediately, or indirectly 
and over the long run-almost all of these factors. Thus, in consider-
ing the nonidentity problem, the woman's choice should not be 
considered apart from the circumstances in which it is made. And 
those circumstances cannot be considered apart from social policies 
that might influence them. 
The most important reason that the nonidentity problem is of 
only limited interest is that the harm directly suffered by the ille-
gitimate child is neither the exclusive, nor perhaps even the most 
important, form of socially cognizable harm that is perceived to re-
sult from extramarital childbearing. Although illegitimate children 
suffer deprivations, the consequences of creating a deprived class of 
children reach beyond the children themselves. Public order suffers, 
the public suffers collectively, and some members of the public suf-
fer individually by being unlucky enough to encounter persons from 
the deprived class who are poorly equipped to fulfill their personal 
responsibilities, or worse. Of course, some extramarital childbearing 
could be considered "harmless" in producing children who become 
solid citizens. Thus, the children and citizens who suffer adverse 
effects from the social practice of out-of-wedlock childbearing can-
not be identified ahead of time. (In the words of Jeremy Bentham, 
they are not "assignable individuals.")127 The harm at issue takes the 
127. See Gerald Postema, Collective Evils, Harms, and the Linv, 97 ETHICS 414, 421 
(1987). 
SUMMER 1996] The Two-Parent Family 533 
form of a collective risk and, in that respect, is similar to other tyJ?es 
of harms that are routinely the subject of legislative intervention.u 
B. Neutrality Towards Family Forms 
It is difficult to deny that the effects that are claimed to How 
from the increase in out-of-wedlock childbearing provid e at least 
some "rational basis" for governmental action. A fairiy unproblem-
atic reading of the harm principle alone gives the sta te a "legitimate 
interest" in reducing the risks posed by the growth in the number of 
extramarital births. Put another way, if two-parent families on aver-
age do a better job than single parents of raising functional, law-
abiding citizens, and thereby impose fewer costs on societ:;v, then the 
government may legitimately promote the formation of tw o-parent 
families. One way to attempt to promote the fo rmation of tw o parent 
families is to try to manipulate economic incentives for behavior 
through the design of cash benefit welfare programs. Which policy 
options are compatible with the goal of promoting the formation of 
two-parent families? vVhich policies work best? Among many pos-
sible options in the design of cash benefit programs, three will be 
discussed here: across-the-board income supports or guaranteed in-
come (which will be termed "neutral intervention"); programs that 
refrain from providing cash grants or direct forms of financial assis-
tance to anyone (neutral nonintervention); and programs that 
provide cash benefits only to some favored types of "conventional" 
families (Cahill-like programs, or selective subsidies). 
There is considerable appeal to the seemingly "neutral" options 
presented above, because the government appears not to "take 
sides." In addition to the desirability of sidestepping the difficulties 
posed by the problem of unconstitutional conditions, there are 
political, pragmatic, and ideological reasons to prefer policies that 
appear to be evenhanded if those programs will in fact still have the 
effect of encouraging people to follow the government's preferences 
for family life. Are the options that fit that bill-blanket subsidies or 
no subsidies-equivalent in their effect on choice of family form? We 
put aside for now the theoretical question of whether "neutrality" of 
government action is even a coherent concept, which is addressed 
below. 129 We focus initially on the more pragmatic questions of the 
empirical relationship between welfare programs and social reality. 
128. See FEINBERG, supra note 80, at 191 (noting tha t in applying the harm 
principle, "[t]he important concept for the legislator .. . is neither magnitude of harm 
nor probability of harm alone, but rather, the compound of the two, which is called 
risk") ; see also Postema, supra note 127, at 434-36. 
129. See infra Part Ill. D. 
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An examination of that interplay reveals that seemingly "neutral" 
solutions can produce very different results. 
I suggest that a proper analysis of the dynamics of social norms 
that surround illegitimacy leads to the conclusion that not all for-
mally evenhanded welfare policies will end up being "neutral" in 
practice. Two of the options outlined above-giving no one money 
and giving everyone money-can be expected to have quite differ-
ent effects on family formation. That result requires accepting a basic 
proposition: that significant aspects of behavior bearing on the suc-
cess of child-rearing arrangements and the choice of family forms 
are governed by preexisting, extralegal conventions of social life, 
with which government policy interacts, but which governments do 
not originate and cannot always manipulate or control at will. 
This point can be illustrated with an example. Consider Martha 
Fineman's proposal that the law revoke the privileged position of 
the patriarchal, heterosexual, two-parent family. She suggests that 
marriage be abolished as a legal institution and that the government 
withdraw from the business of enforcing spousal rights and respon-
sibilities within the marital relationship. 130 Marriage would be 
replaced by the application of "the same rules that regulate other 
interactions in our society-specifically those of contract and prop-
erty, as well as tort and criminal law."131 Private arrangements 
would be supplemented by a purely functional approach to the col-
lective financing of childcare: the government would subsidize 
caretakers and their dependents, regardless of biological or legal re-
1 . h" 132 atwns 1p. 
Fineman does not expressly put forward her proposal as a 
means of achieving greater governmental "neutrality" towards fam-
ily forms. At least she does not state that as a principal goal, and her 
apparent sympathies with a "social constructivist" view of gender 
relations may well lead her to doubt the coherence of that project. 133 
Nevertheless, her proposal does have some appeal to those who be-
lieve that the government should take an evenhanded approach-
130. See MARTHA A. FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND 
OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 226-36 (1994). 
131. Id. at 229. 
132. Fineman's rather sketchy model raises a host of questions about, for example, 
the precise nature of the rights and responsibilities of natural parents and/ or volun-
tary caretakers towards children in their care. Presumably, natural fathers would 
have no obligation towards their natural children unless they contracted, or acted, to 
incur those obligations. Nor would they have anything like parental rights in their 
children, unless voluntarily procured . Fineman says little about whether the same 
rules would apply to mothers, or how adults could bargain over access to, and obli-
gations towards, children if no one had any preexisting claims on those children. 
These questions are beyond the scope of our concerns, however. 
133. See infra notes 145-46 and accompanying text. 
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which could perhaps be conceptualized as one that leaves open all 
choices on an apparently impartial basis, while possibly 
"facilitating" some choices that might not previously have been 
made. That aspiration, however, potentially breaks down over the 
matter of subsidies. Because of the nature of reproductive norms, 
cash grants for all will not have the same effect as leaving this area 
entirely to "private forces ." 
This point depends on accepting that many "civilized" norms of 
sexual behavior are unstable and that the normative expectations 
that regulate conduct in the areas of sexuality, reproduction, and 
family life are especially fragile because they require individuals to 
keep at bay powerful natural impulses towards selfish or predatory 
behaviors. 1 3~ Although the forces that create and maintain group 
norms for behavior are also powerful (and probably ultimately bio-
logically based) ,135 those norms are vulnerable to subversion by 
m easures that undermine or destroy the social sanctions that cus-
tomarily operate to suppress self-regarding strategies. 
In many societies (including our own), the set of social sanc-
tions that discourage out-of-wedlock childbearing has customarily 
included the difficulty of procuring adequate financial support for 
the mother-child unit. That support is ordinarily supplied by the 
father or by the extended kinship group. This form of "scarcity" is in 
part a product of simple economics (the inherent difficulties of one 
person caring for a child while making a living, or the limits on re-
sources available for the child's support). But it has also been 
enforced by custom and deliberate choice--in the form of wage and 
employment discrimination against women and the reluctance of 
kin to extend support to mother-child units formed through extra-
marital birth. The mother-child unit's poor intrinsic economic 
prospects make it socially marginal, which may of have led societies 
deliberately to impose additional economic sanctions, further in-
creasing its marginality.136 The "natural" scarcity faced by each 
mother-child unit is thus reinforced by private action. The rationale 
behind that action ultimately has much to do with economics, since 
widespread out-of-wedlock childbearing confronts societies with 
thorny problems of production and distribution. Nevertheless, the 
customary sanctions imposed against single mothers are fueled by 
normative conventions that can exist independent of the financial 
134. See Wax, supra note 78, at 337-51. 
135. See id . 
136. In the words of Charles Murray, "Throughout human history, a single 
woman with a small child has not been a viable economic unit. Not being a viable 
economic unit, neither have the single woman and child been a legitimate social 
unit." Murray, supra note 7. 
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exigencies of a particular situation and that have force over and 
above the immediate constraints of "natural" scarcity. The sum total 
of the resulting economic hardship brings social norms to bear as a 
constraint on behavior. 
It is to be expected, then, that the government's decision to 
supply financial su pport to ail families will have a subversive effect 
on the traditional t-wo-parent family precisely because it will throw 
the principal alternative-single-parent families-an "artificial" fi-
nancial lifeline that would not ordin2rily be available. Two-parent 
families will also receive cash benefits, b u t that subsidy w ill have a 
smaller effect on people's "baseline" choices because traditional 
families are in general more economically self-sufficient. Thus, sub-
sidizing traditional fami lies w ill less often h ave the effect of 
removing an extralegal obstacle to choosing that way of life. On this 
analysis, across-the-board guaranteed income su pports are likely to 
tip the balance towards single-parent families by removing an im-
portant barrier to forming them. Put another way, the two-parent 
family model is more vulnerable to subversion through universal 
subsidization than the one-parent family. That observation applies 
equally to Martha Fineman's hypothetical world, in which some 
people will choose to live together in a state of "virtual" marriage, 
and others in single-parent units. The balance between the two 
groups will inevitably be affected by the availability of income sup-
ports for all. 
The soundness of this conclusion has been borne out by studies 
of negative income tax, guaranteed income, and income mainte-
nance pilot programs conducted during the 1970s. These proposals 
were thought to be superior to AFDC on the strength of their very 
"neutrality": they do not overtly favor single-p arent families over 
two-parent and working families, as they provide subsidies regard-
less of marital status or the number of adults in the household. The 
programs are still thought to have that virtue. 137 In study after study, 
however, the guaranteed benefits appeared to h ave a negative im-
pact on family stability, significantly increasing the divorce and 
separation rate and lowering the marriage rate. 138 
In sum, an understanding of the dynamics of social norms sug-
gests that the ideal of government "neutrality" towards family 
lifestyle and reproductive choice cannot be achieved through one 
137. See, e.g., Michael Kinsley, The Ultimate Block Grant , NEW YORKER, May 29, 
1995, at 37 (defending the guaranteed income as a "libertarian" solution to the prob-
lem of poverty). 
138. See MARTIN ANDERSON, W ELFARE 1"19 (1978) (surveying data on family 
breakups from guaranteed income and income maintenance experiments nation-
wide); see also JENCKS, supra note 4, at 133-36; Moffitt, supra note 67, at 209-29. 
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strategy of so-called neutral interven tion--that is, supplying cash 
grants to all. Handing out money all around is formalistically even-
handed, but when considered against the baseline of preexisting 
social and econornic forces, such indiscriminate largesse creates a set 
of incentives that is q uite uneven and far from neutral. This obser-
vation suggests that a similar but opp osite point can fairly be made 
about a strategy of "neutral noninten·ention"-that is, abolishing 
cash benefi ts entirely . Such a strategy involves w holesale state inac-
tion, and therefore raises no doctrinal problems (such as 
unconstitutional conditions) and requires no doctrinal justification 
(such as the identification of a legitimate state interest). But there is 
an irnportant sense in which the decision not to act, although formal-
istically neutral, is no more eveTh'tanded in its potential impact than 
the decision to establish a p rogram of universal entitlements. Be-
cause social and economic reali ties make it difficult fo r the mother-
child unit to achieve self-sufficiency, nonintervention would appear 
to preserve a powerful incentive to refrain from childbearing outside 
marriage. That incentive is not initially of the government's making, 
but the decision to leave it undisturbed is very much the govern-
ment' s choice. 
The point of the foregoing passage is that the goals of enhanc-
ing, or at the very least preserving, whatever forces lead women to 
bear children within marriage through the creation of seemingly 
"neutral" cash benefit programs-i.e., those that do not appear to 
favor some families over others-will prove elusive so long as the 
program operates against the preexisting background of social cus-
tom and economic reali ty. The goals are only consistent with the 
government staying its hand entirely or adopting a program of what 
I term "selective subsidies"-providing cash benefits only to some or 
all two-parent families. We have already argued that selective sub-
sidies can be justified on the basis of the "harm" principle. In 
deciding w hether such a policy should actually be implemented, 
however, there are a number of important issues that should be ad-
dressed. The pertinent questions, some of which will be taken up in 
the remainder of this paper, include: w hether selective subsidization 
as a strategy for dealing with the harm resulting from out-of-
wedlock childbearing is justified on the balance of costs and bene-
fi ts; whether alternative strategies (such as countering the ill effects 
of extramarital childbearing) would be preferable and work better; 
and finally (and perhaps most importantly) whether the incentives 
created by selective income supports can be expected to have the 
intended effects of reducing the incidence of out-of-wedlock child-
bearing in practice. 
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C. Costs and Benefits 
The case so far considered for minimizing the incidence of out-
of-wedlock childbearing takes the ill effects of the practice as ineluc-
table: it looks at the reality of the lives of children in single-parent 
families and the consequences for the rest of us, but does not ask 
whether the reality could be transformed and the harm eliminated 
through an entirely different series of policy choices. 
In questioning whether the government may, or should, act on 
public concerns about the rise of single-parent families and out-of-
wedlock childbearing, some feminist scholars139 have abandoned 
exclusive reliance on the view that the decision to bear a child out of 
wedlock falls on the "self-regarding" side of Mill's line-the line that 
separates actions that do not have the kind of adverse impact on 
others that make them a legitimate concern of government from 
those that do. In an effort to deal with the argument from social 
harm, these scholars have taken a number of tacks. The first is to ar-
gue, in effect, that the government should not single out and act 
upon the harms from out-of-wedlock childbearing without consider-
ing both the benefits of that phenomenon and the detrimental 
consequences of combating the effects. On this view, government 
should not attempt to influence choices in the areas of reproduction 
and family forms on the basis of the identification of some harm, but 
only on a recognition of net harm-that is, after weighing up total 
costs as well as benefits. The suggestion seems to carry with it an 
implicit requirement that the government achieve a high degree of 
certainty regarding the balance of costs and benefits before it can act 
to influence conduct in this sensitive area-a kind of special rule of 
prudence that excepts programs designed to deal with the problem 
139. See, e.g., Susan B. Ape!, Communitarianism and Feminism: The Case Against the 
Preference for the Two-Parent Family, 10 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 12-16 (1995) (arguing 
that conventional marriage should not be sanctioned or encouraged by the state be-
cause marriage is harmful to women overall and may cause net harm to children, 
whose fate is tied so closely to that of women); Pepper Schwartz, Gender and the Lib-
eral Family, RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY, Spring 1991, at 86, 86-89 (arguing that a "newly 
enforced" two-parent family ideal will lead to increased unhappiness and decreased 
well-being for women, which will hurt their children in the long run). See generally 
Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 
835, 835 (1985) [hereinafter Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention]; Frances E. Olsen, 
The Family and the Market . A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497 
(1983) [hereinafter Olsen, The Family and the Market]; Nancy E. Dowd, Stigmatizing 
Single Parents , 18 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 19 (1995); FINEMAN, supra note 130; Wallach & 
Tenoso, supra note 65; Larry Cata Backer, Welfare Reform at the Limit: The Futility of 
"Ending Welfare as We Know It," 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 339 (1995); McClain, su-
pra note 120; Dorothy E. Roberts, The Only Good Poor Woman: Uncon stitutional 
Conditions and Welfare, 72 DENY. U. L. REv. 931 (1995); Iris Young, Making Single 
Motherhood Normal, DISSENT, Winter 1994, at 88, 91-92. 
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of illegitimacy and single-parent poverty from the ordinary rule of 
legislative speculation. 140 
It is unclear whether the suggestion for a more complete calcu-
lus is merely intended as a policy recommendation or is meant to 
function as a doctrine of limitation on legitimate government action. 
If put to work imposing real limits on lawmaking, these insights 
would in effect force a modification of the notion of what constitutes 
a "rational basis" for legislative action. To be sure, one could argue 
that a rationality analysis that looks only at one side of the equation 
is overly "atomistic"141 in fai ling to take account of the comprehen-
sive social setting of legislation and its effects. This critique functions 
very differently, however, when it is brought to bear to urge uphold-
ing a legislative judgment that would othenvise be questioned (as in 
the illegitimacy cases),
142 
than when it is to be applied, as here, in an 
attempt to delegitimate legislative judgments about how best to deal 
with a social problem. In the former case, it is the legislature that has 
taken into account a comprehensive set of factors, which the courts 
proceed to ignore. In the latter, it is the legislature that is claimed to 
have failed to measure, assign, and assess the costs and benefits, so 
the courts must now do so. Yet that is a job to which the courts are 
notoriously unsuited, and one that is ripe for manipulation depend-
ing on the particular theory of social causation adopted. 143 
140. See supra note 139. A more popular expression of the "net benefit" view can 
be found in a recent editorial in the Economist: 
Simply, it is too soon to say of society at large that the rise in divorce and the 
increase in single parent households ... has gone so far that the loss out-
weighs the gain. Without compelling evidence that the net harm is great, and 
perhaps not even then, govemments have no business imposing their moral 
choices on citizens. This remains true even if it is mainly adults who benefit 
from more divorce and mainly children who lose .... 
The Disappearing Family, ECONOMIST, Sept. 9, 1995, at 19. 
141. See supra Part II.A.1 . 
142. See id. 
143. The second problem with formulating a "special" or heightened rational basis 
rule is that it is unclear when it should apply. Why is the cost/benefit calculus not 
required to validate every piece of legislation? One possibility is that the heightened 
standard comes into play where fundamental values and judgments are at issue and 
where there is significant disagreement on conceptions of the "good life." As Thomas 
Nagel explains, however, there is disagreement and a "pluralism" of views on many 
questions of public policy that do not implicate fundamental issues of sexual moral-
ity and family life, but the majority is still allowed to impose its will on the minority 
as a matter of course. See Nagel, supra note 88, at 231-32. See generally authorities 
cited in supra note 88. Thus, the fault line cannot be that the majority is trampling the 
interests of the minority. We are left with the question of why we should impose a 
more stringent "harm" test in some morally charged areas but not in other areas that 
do not directly implicate moral concerns, but in which disagreements are intransi-
gent or deeply felt. 
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D. Harm As Socially Constructed: The Possibility of Compensation 
Yet another tack against the functional traditionalists' argument 
for confining p oor support to conventional two-parent families rests 
on an assumption about the source of the supposed harms inflicted 
on children and society by children being raised by one parent. The 
assumption is that whatever harms are generated are not "intrinsic" 
to the single-parent family as such-that is, they do not "naturally" 
or inevitab ly flow from the fact of out-of-wedlock birth or the ab-
sence of the father . Rather, these effects are the product, more 
narrovvly, of enshrining distinctions based on circumstance of birth 
directly into law144 or, more broadly, of a web of adverse social and 
economic conditions that are ultimately the product of political 
choices. 
The notion that the unfortunate lot of illegitimate children is 
ultimately the product of governmental action (or inaction) is one 
species of the view that social reality--encompassing everything 
from economics and family life to preferences and attitudes-is 
"socially constructed."145 The harms that flow from certain social 
144. See authorities cited in supra note 139; see also Wallach & Tenoso, supra note 
65, at 60, 61-63 (suggesting that eliminating all legal classifications based on circum-
stance of birth would in large part negate the "stigma" and the attendant social 
disadvantages that attach to illegitimate birth, and recommending that "the institu-
tion of illegitimacy should be abolished" through adoption of a "Proposed Uniform 
Legitimacy Act" that grants illegitimate children "equality of legal status"). It is diffi-
cult to maintain that merely changing the law to eliminate any legal recognition of 
distinctions based on illegitimate birth would equalize the status and circumstances 
of children in single-parent and two-parent families. Indeed, even Wallach and 
Tenoso acknowledge that some legal rights will inevitably tum on proof of the bio-
logical parent-child relationship . See id. at 64. Even if in-wedlock children were not 
entitled to the customary presumption of paternity, they would still , as a group, find 
it much easier than out-of-wedlock children to prove the identity of their natural 
fathers. 
145. On social constructivism generally, see Daniel Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Is 
the Radical Critique of Merit Anti-Semitic, 83 CAL. L. REv. 853, 855-57 (1995); Wax, su-
pra note 78. "Social constructivism" refers to the view that social conditions are the 
product of behaviors and environmental influences that can be manipulated by po-
litical means. It follows that any undesirable social condition can be quite 
dramatically altered or corrected through government intervention. The notion that 
the conditions that constrain human existence are socially constructed is often con-
trasted with the view that "natural," pre-social forces-such as biological 
predispositions-place limits on the possible forms of social life. See, e.g., Janet E. 
Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A Critique of the Argument from 
Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REV. 503, 550-53 (1994) (discussing various "constructivist" 
theses in the context of homosexuality); Daniel R. Ortiz, Creating Controversy: Essen-
tialism and Constructivism and the Politics of Gay Identity , 79 VA. L. REV. 1833, 1843-48 
(1993) (same); Deborah L. Rhode, The "No-Problem" Problem: Feminist Challenges and 
Cultltral Change, 100 YALE L.J. 1731, 1784-90 (1991) (downplaying the role of biologi-
cal differences between the sexes); Nancy Levit, Feminism for Men: Legal Ideology and 
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conditions are wholly dependent on the "rules of the game"-the 
policies and laws that a society chooses to adopt. Although law may 
appear to have nothing to do with the existence of certain social and 
economic conditions-which rather seem to be the product of indi-
vidual choices and behaviors-that appearance is illusory. For one 
thing, behaviors and choices are decisively influenced by social 
conditions that are subject to manipulation. Even if individual be-
havior is not entirely manipulable , however, the consequences 
attached to individual choices and behaviors are w holly the creation 
of politics and law and can be altered at will by governmental ac-
.... 
LlOn. 
These insights inevitably influence any conception of what the 
law can (and should) do. For one, the law can always be other than it 
is. It follows that social and economic conditions can be other than 
they are and that the way to change them is by changing the law. All 
social conditions are up for grabs, and the law 's potential to correct 
social ills is limited only by political will. Moreover, on this view, 
there is no "baseline" set of conditions that is beyond the law's 
reach. There is no such thing as a "pre-legal" distribution of wealth, 
property, entitlement, social influence, or authority, and no preexist-
ing justification for adopting any one set of legal rules to govern the 
distribution of wealth or power. 146 This understanding goes along 
with the view that the law cannot avoid taking sides in ideological 
battles and power struggles. The very possibility of the neutrality of 
law is incoherent, because there is no independent social reality 
against which to be neutral. 
A variation on this theme-and a strong undercurrent in femi-
nist scholarship on family law and welfare policy-is the assertion 
that existing familial arrangements are at bottom all creatures of the 
the Construction of Maleness, 43 UCLA L. REv. 1037 (1996) (same); Richard A. Epstein, 
The Authoritarian Impulse in Sex Discrimination Law: A Reply to Professors Abrams and 
Strauss, 41 DEPAUL L. REv. 1041 , 1047 (1992) (defining the theory of "social construc-
tion" as positing that behaviors are "not seriously constrained by biological 
elements"). 
There is a strain of constructivist thought that appears not to rest on a com-
mitment to the view that human behavior is unconstrained by a preexisting or 
biological "nature." That school emphasizes the malleability not of human nature but 
of the social significance or consequences attached to biologically-influenced human 
choices, and the error in seeing those consequences as "natural." Cass Sunstein seems 
to take this approach. See infra note 146 and accompanying text. 
146. These ideas find expression in Cass Sunstein 's work on the jurisprudence of 
the New Deal. According to Sunstein, the courts' growing acceptance of legislative 
intervention in the free market-in the form of the regulation of business and direct 
redistribution--coincided with an understanding of laissez-faire rules of exchange as 
"state-created, hardly neutral, and without prepolitical status." Sunstein, supra note 
101, at 882. 
542 Michigan Journal of Race & Law [VOL. 1:2 
state. 147 A corollary of this view of family life is that the relative dis-
advantages suffered by those who make unconventional choices 
must be laid at the feet of rules that "privilege" some family forms 
over others. Since the rules can be other than they are, it follows that 
the disadvantages can readily be reversed or corrected by altering 
government policy through law. Just as it is possible to change the 
law to deprive two-parent families of dominant or privileged status, 
so the law also can be modified to insure that one-parent families are 
not bad for children. Because the harms to children and society from 
having only one parent are "socially constructed," it is within the 
government's power to equalize the lot of children across all family 
situations. The principal challenge is to hit on the correct policy for-
mula for accomplishing this goal. 
From this set of assumptions, it can be argued that the first line 
of approach to the social fallout from illegitimacy should be to 
change the social and economic conditions that give rise to the 
harms, rather than to try to deter the behaviors that produce them. 
In other words, we should treat the symptoms rather than attempt to 
reduce the incidence of the disease. 
There are two main justifications for this priority, or hierarchy, 
of harm-reducing strategies. The first relies on the observation that, 
although single-parent families are costly to society, some individu-
als benefit from them. Single parenthood is a preferable option for 
women seeking to escape oppressive or dangerous relationships or 
to avoid the perceived exploitation inherent in some marital ar-
rangements. Second, Cahill-like strategies have some element of 
"coercion," in that they bring pressure to bear on women to exercise 
their reproductive autonomy in approved ways. A preference for the 
least drastic means of reducing social harm dictates that the gov-
ernment should avoid making "autonomy reducing"148 offers in 
147. This view holds that the patriarchal, two-parent family system has no life of 
its own. The family is not an autonomous institution that functions according to in-
temal, extralegal logic, roles, dynamic, or rules ; it is not an institution that the 
government can elect to tolerate, discourage, or encourage, but for which the gov-
emment does not provide the original foundation. Rather, it is the product of social 
and political choices implemented by a complex legal regime. See, e.g., Olsen, The 
Myth of State Intervention, supra note 139, at 835 ("A useful comparison can be drawn 
between arguments against a policy of nonintervention in the private family and 
arguments against a policy of nonintervention in the free market."); Olsen, The Fam-
ily and the Marke t, supra note 139. 
148. The problem of unconstitutional conditions is so difficult in part because 
there is little consensus over whether offers to forgo rights at a price are "coercive"-
that is, whether they are "autonomy-reducing"-Dr whether they should be viewed 
as "autonomy-expanding" invitations to engage in efficient voluntary exchange. See, 
e.g. , Kreimer, supra note 17, at 1352-59 (discussing "offers" and "threats"); Sullivan, 
supra note 17, at 1446-50 (discussing the concept of "coercion"); see also Baker, supra 
note 17, at 1191-93 (discussing the "frequently invoked justification for absolute ju-
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favor of less "coercive" alternatives. Finally, it is asserted that extra-
marital childbearing will always be with us, despite the 
government's best efforts. Therefore, the government's resources are 
best directed at reducing the deprivations suffered by the innocent 
children who will inevitably be born without two parents. For all 
these reasons, efforts to abrogate the harm of out-of-wedlock child-
bearing are to be preferred to attempts to induce people to avoid 
d . h h 149 pro ucmg t e arm. 
This argument is ultimately unconvincing. Even if we assume 
the premise-that the harms of extramarital birth are compensable-
the redistributive and regulatory measures that the government 
would have to undertake to "equalize" the lot of children in single-
parent and two-parent families would in themselves be quite coer-
cive and disruptive and would entail considerable downside costs in 
resistance and loss of efficiency.150 There is quite a good possibility, 
however, that the premise is false . The argument assumes that the 
advantages that attach to one type of family structure can ultimately 
be traced back to the legal rules that maintain that structure. If that 
assumption is wrong-if extralegal norms and the patterns they 
support have vitality apart from the structures mandated by law-
then perhaps that is because the institutions those norms support 
have an intrinsic functional superiority that is independent of their 
legally privileged status. 
Can political choices compensate for the harms that are claimed 
to flow from the rising incidence of single-parent families, or is there 
some irreducible consequence that is beyond manipulation by the 
state? Put another way, is the two-parent family "naturally" more 
conducive to social stability or better suited than the single-parent 
family to the raising of children? Is the superiority of one type of 
family configuration a product of social injustice, or is it something 
dicial deference" towards the imposition of conditions on the exercise of rights: that 
the acceptance of conditions when offered is a Pareto-superior result); Epstein , supra 
note 17, at 7-11 (discussing the Pareto model of conditional benefits). 
149. These are policy arguments, rather than points made in a doctrinal debate 
concerning standards for "rational" or nonarbitrary government action. The points 
potentially bear on whether Cahill-like attempts to discourage out-of-wedlock child-
bearing are "rational" if the measure of rationality is expanded to include choosing 
the strategy to eliminate the most harm at the lowest cost. See supra Part III. C. 
150. Any attempt to provide children with even partial compensation for the dis-
advantages of being born out of wedlock would require a massive and intrusive 
redistribution of resources. In addition, government programs designed to compen-
sate children for the disadvantages of being raised by a single parent would work at 
cross-purposes with attempts to reduce the incidence of extramarital births by un-
dermining an important deterrent to out-of-wedlock childbearing, which is the fear 
that one's children will suffer disadvantage and deprivation if born out of wedlock. 
Equalization would also generate resentment from parents in traditional families 
who believe that it is just for children to retain some of the comparative advantage 
they enjoy from their parents' socially responsible behavior. 
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for which, by the very order of things, the government can never 
wholly compensate? 151 
The government can redistribute income, equalize educational 
resources and opportunity at an institutional level, and provide 
other tangible benefits to children and fam ilies. What it cannot do is 
provide a father. Even if the father is identified, and forced to take 
some financial resp onsibility, the state cannot-short of virtual im-
prisonment-insure the father's physical presence. 152 For that reason, 
the "natural" advantages that flow from the presence of a liv ing, 
breathing fa ther in the home are not those the state can readily sup-
ply. Even harder for a state to mimic is a father who is not merely 
grudgingly present, but who is also willing and involved. The state 
cannot generate and redistribute love, care, devotion, interest, en-
couragement, emotional support, advocacy, personal attention and 
assistance, example, fidelity, and discipline. It can attempt, perhaps, 
to engage professional or hired surrogates to supply these good 
things in select cases. Any effort effectively to substitute for "the real 
thing" on a large scale is almost certainly doomed to failure. 153 
In sum, the state cannot replace the father. The real-world con-
sequences of that inability, of course, turn on an assessment of what 
actual-as opposed to ideal-fathers are worth. How often are two 
heads better than one? If most fathers offer little more than a pay-
check, then it is tempting to answer "not often," as the government is 
151. This query assumes a claim of average superiority, which is not inconsistent 
with the possibility that some single-parent families do a better job than some two-
parent famili es. 
152. This statement begs the question of why a state cannot use its coercive p ower 
to control the fa ther 's legal relationship with the mother of his children and to insure 
the father's presence in the home. For instance, the govenunent could require a man 
to marry the mother o f his children or to establish the home of the wife and children 
as his residence. Even aside from the constitutional difficulties of such restrictions 
under current law, the limitations inherent in such measures are obvious. A m an can 
only marry one woman, so the marriage requirement would not supply a father to 
children fathered on more than one woman. Moreover, marriage and the require-
ment of co-residence would not in themselves guarantee a father's physical presence; 
that would have to be enforced by draconian interventions such as physical monitor-
ing or house arrest. Even if such measures were feasible, the need for them would 
probably destroy any benefits they are designed to confer, since the salutary effects 
correlated with a father in the home are likely to depend on the man 's choosing, 
however grudgingly, to be there. It is almos t certainly not the father's presence as 
such, but his volun tary presence that counts. 
153. By "father" I mean principally a biological fa ther. That is not to sugges t that 
adoptive fatherhood cannot be as successful and effective as biological fatherhood. I 
would submit, however, that adoptive fatherhood works well only agains t the back-
ground of biological fatherhood as the dominant mode. It is the biological tie that 
provides the foundation for the exemplary patterns of fidelity and vigilant care as-
sociated with good fatherhood. Without this model to set the standard for emulation, 
adoptive fatherhood would likely be a less successful institution. 
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perfectly capable of providing money. Although it IS difficult to 
know hovv the quality of fathering varies, social science research 
suggests that the statistical presence of the father in the h ome is, on 
average, w orth a lot. The sustained attention of a devoted and con-
scientious father may well be worth even more, and the children of 
such fathers form a kind of "natural aristocracy" even within the 
group of those growing up in intact families, enjoying enormous in-
tangible advantages that compound the material advantages already 
enjoyed by children raised by two parents. 15~ More to the point, the 
absence of a conscientious father creates a "naturally" disadvantaged 
class of children, doubly deprived both of material support and of 
personal attention. 
The state cannot supply a father. Nor can it repl ace him. But 
one v1ay to equalize the lot of children may be to dep rive them all of 
fathers. As noted, Martha Fineman proposes that marriage and fa-
therhood be abolished as legal categories, to be replaced by a purely 
functional role of state-supported caretaker. 155 If fathers no longer 
have any legally enforceable rights or responsibilities with respect to 
their natural children or their children' s mother, then the basic pre-
conditions for the existence of a privileged class of children would 
seem to disappear. Every child would be on a par with respect to 
fathers because no child would have preexisting claims agains t any 
man, nor any man responsibility for a child. 
Even in such a brave new world, however, there would still 
emerge a "natural aristocracy" of children whose fathers were will-
ing to behave like "real" fathers, entering into voluntary private 
arrangements reflecting that choice. The point does n ot d epend on 
the legal status of marriage, or even on the existence of enforceable 
contracts. Regardless of legal formality, there would still be a 
"natural" disparity in the life-course and well-being of children who 
are born into virtual families (those voluntarily conforming to the 
two-parent model of faithful, physically present, caring parents, de-
spite the absence of legal recognition or protection) and those w ho 
are not. Of course, families living on the traditional model-whether 
perfected by formal contract or not-might be less common than 
they are today because whatever incentives are created by the legal 
privileges currently attached to marriage would be gone. That 
would not change the fact that virtual marriage offers benefits for 
children-benefits that are, in an important sense, beyond the reach 
of the state. It follows that many of the detriments of the alterna-
tive-the single-parent caretaker-are also beyond the state 's reach. 
154. See supra Part III.A. 
155. See FINEMAN, supra note 130; see also supra notes 130-32 and accompanying 
text. 
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These are facts of social life--and, perhaps, of human nature-that 
stand apart from the government's well-intentioned intervention. 
If this vision is correct, what does that say of the argument that 
the government should first eliminate the harms of single parent-
hood before seeking to discourage single parenthood through 
"autonomy-reducing" measures? It suggests that the strategy won' t 
work-those harms cannot be entirely, or even perhaps largely, 
eliminated . Although some of the disadvantages of single parent-
hood (for example, relative lack of material resources) are at least 
theoretically amenable to full correction by the state, a reduction in 
the incidence of single parenthood is still the only way fully to 
eliminate the social fallout of this pattern. On this view, attempting 
to discourage out-of-wedlock births through Cahill-like statutes is a 
wholly "rational" strategy, in that the alternatives can never effec-
tively deal with the problem. 
Of course, some will continue to resist these conclusions. The al-
ternative of compensating for disadvantage directly does not impose 
the countervailing costs of governmental attempts to influence per-
sonal decisions on reproduction and family formation, or of 
pressuring women into "patriarchal" marriages as the price for 
having children, or of forcing children to suffer because they are 
born to women who, for whatever reason, are unresponsive to the 
government's attempts to change their behavior. For some, the al-
ternative of compensating for harm-rather than attacking it at its 
source--will always be more attractive because the tradeoffs are too 
hard to bear, even for a potentially more complete solution. 
E. Will It W ork? 
One remaining question in the calculus has to do with efficacy. 
Can Cahill-like statutes be expected to achieve the objective of actu-
ally reducing the incidence of single-parent family formation? The 
question is potentially relevant to doctrine because the Supreme 
Court in the illegitimacy cases declared the state statutes at issue 
"irrational" based in part on its "finding" that there was no realistic 
expectation that they would work. 156 And effectiveness is always of 
156. Although I have criticized this aspect of the Court's decisions, I do not pur-
port to offer a comprehensive theory of how the element of efficacy should figure in 
rationality analysis or how courts should assess whether a statu te will tend to ac-
complish its stated purpose. The relationship between evidence of efficacy and 
whether the purpose of legislation is "rational" is a complex issue not addressed 
here. See, e.g., Scott Bice, Rationality Analysis in Constitutional Law, 65 MINN. L. REV. 1, 
33-37 (1980) (discussing the role of empirical data in the judgment of legislative ra-
tionality). 
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paramount importance in deciding whether to adopt a measure as a 
matter of policy. In considering whether Cahill-like statutes would 
work, we should strive to avoid the errors made by the Supreme 
Court in its analysis and attempt to take a more comprehensive view 
of the legal and social setting in which the question must be an-
swered. 
Anne Alstott points out that, in evaluating the potential effects 
of social policies, "[i]t is essential to distinguish disincentives from 
the effects of disincentives on behavior."157 It is dangerous to con-
clude that economic disincentives will always induce a change in 
personal conduct, and such conclusions are especially problematic 
when it comes to sexual and reproductive behavior. Indeed, a real-
istic understanding of the dynamics of social norms in the highly 
moralized sphere of reproduction would seem to cast a shadow over 
claims that the sudden adoption of programs that selectively confer 
benefits on favored family forms will significantly alter current so-
cial patterns. The fact that illegitimacy rates have increased much 
more rapidly among the poor than among the non-poor over the 
past fifty years158 provides the best evidence that the federal gov-
ernment's decision to provide cash benefits only to single-parent 
families through AFDC may have contributed significantly to an 
increase in extramarital births. It does not follow, however, that cut-
ting off those benefits will be nearly as effective in reversing the 
trend. The "one-way ratchet" effect of legal change on social norms 
comes into play here: laws do sometimes help reinforce traditional 
social patterns, and a change in the law that radically alters preexist-
ing incentives for behavior can cause traditional patterns to unravel. 
But the law is more effective in eroding certain types of norms than 
in creating them or restoring them once they have lost their hold. I 
have elsewhere described the one-way ratchet effect of legal change 
on social practice. 159 Once norms have eroded, the damage cannot 
157. Anne L. Alstott, The EITC and the Limitations of Tax-Based Welfare Reform, 108 
HARV. L. REV. 533, 545 (1995) . 
158. See SALUTER, supra note 6. Educated, affluent women still almost always 
marry before bearing children, despite the fact that they are financially better able to 
support children on their own than women with less income. Consequently, single 
parenthood among middle- and upper-class women is almost entirely a product of 
divorce. There could be a number of reasons for this dearth in extramarital births in 
the upper socioeconomic classes: despite professions of tolerance, conventional no-
tions of personal responsibility may continue in force among that group; middle-
and upper-middle-class men may be better socialized to fatherhood and economi-
cally more valuable as husbands, thus countering any financial advantages of "going 
it alone"; or women with independent earning power may feel that single mother-
hood is incompatible with the maintenance of their socioeconomic status or with the 
demands of their careers. 
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necessarily be undone by restoring the legal status quo. ]\liore com-
prehensive and extensive social change may well be required. 
There is reason to fear that the government's power to subvert 
the traditional two-parent family through the design of social pro-
grams will prove greater than its power to return the family to its 
former popularity. In the case of single parenthood, the social dis-
approbation that fo rmerly attached to single paren th ood h as 
diminished significantly. The recen t weakening of legal rules that 
once discouraged irresponsible avoid ance of, or exit from , m arriage 
almost certainly hastened that change.160 Prograrns subsidizing sin-
gle-parent families, and the virtual elimination of legal 
discrimination against illegitimate children, no doubt have also 
p layed some role. The deterioration of the fam ily might have been 
largely avoided if none of these legal measures had been adopted-
and if the New Deal had set up a Cahill-lik e welfare program instead 
of AFDC. It is quite a different matter to think that the trend can be 
reversed by making those changes now. Thus, selective government 
subsidies or economic favoritism, although not entirely w ithout 
force, may be less effective in restoring previous patterns of family 
living than the same measures would have been in preserving those 
patterns in the first place. 
Charles Murray tries to take on this argument by suggesting 
that, although cutting off government largesse may not have a direct 
and immediate effect on behavior, it will eventually contribute to 
shifts in mediating normative expectations and attitudes, which are 
ultimately the most powerful and enduring determinants of patterns 
of sexuality and childbearing. He speculates that the absence of gov-
ernment income supports for new single-parent families will force 
friends and family repeatedly to bear the cost of the "folly of their 
children," which "will make an illegitimate birth the socially horrific 
act it used to be."161 
Whatever the validity of this prediction, one must recognize 
that it is just that: an empirical pred iction, open to testing and proof 
over time. The question is one for social scientists, not judges, to as-
sess. Because the Constitution appears to adopt no particular theory 
159. Once norms erode or cultural life becomes demoralized, "renormalization" 
may be very difficult to achieve. Complex systems of social control-most notably 
those that tightly channel male and female sexuality in socially cons tructive ways-
are particularly vulnerable to subversion by factors, such as economic in cen tives or 
weakened legal sanctions, that lower the cost of flouting social taboos. But once cul-
tural and moral expectations have eroded, they cam10t easily be resurrected by legal 
sanctions or reverse economic incentives. This sugges ts tha t the efficacy of social 
policy interventions may be asymmetrical: they are m ore effective in loosening tra-
ditional behavioral restrictions than in promoting social patterns that dep end on 
personal discipline and restraint. See Wax, supra note 78, at 340-41. 
160. See, e.g., Singer, supra note 14; Glendon, supra note 14. 
161. Murray, supra note 7, at A14; see also Murray, supra note 8, at 26 . 
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of sociology or psychology, the courts ' attempt to embrace one 
school of thought on these questions must make for weak and un-
stable doctrine-or decisions with unintended and unanticipated 
consequences. If a statute cutting off benefits to single-parent fami-
lies were to pass today, there would be no basis for considering it 
"irrational" based on what we know, although experience may yet 
teach us that it fails miserably to accomplish its ultimate purpose. 
Finally, we must recognize that it is possible to ask too much 
from the decision to cut off income supports for nonmarital families. 
Perhaps, contra Charles Murray, a withdrawal of benefits w ill not in 
itself set in motion the changes ar-..d adjustments that will ultimately 
restore old patterns of conduct. The forces that are strong enough to 
trigger the necessary sequence of behavioral reforms will have to be 
of another order, proceeding from very different sources. It may still 
be the case, however, that providing benefits to single mothers is a 
critical obstacle to any widespread change in behavior among the 
populations most vulnerable to the detrimental effects of their own 
conduct. In other words, a change in the patterns of government 
"subsidization" is an absolutely necessary-although very far from 
sufficient-precondition for any significant lowering of the out-of-
wedlock birth rate. Without "desubsidization," we might as well 
give up on turning these statistics around and accept that the prob-
lem will continue to grow despite every other governmental 
initiative and effort. 
CONCLUSION-A NEW CIVIL RIGHTS VISION? 
This paper was presented at a conference on the future of civil 
rights. The problem of single-parent families is a civil rights prob-
lem. Most particularly, it is a problem for the Black community 
because single-parent families are far more common among Blacks 
and most Black children are brought up by only one parent. 162 The 
problem is not just absolute, but comparative. Sixty-eight percent of 
all Black children are born out of wedlock, and the rate of out-of-
wedlock births is three times higher among Blacks than Whites. 163 
The disparity in living arrangements is pronounced even among the 
well-educated, which means that the advantages enjoyed by chil-
dren from White, affluent, well-educated families are compounded 
by disproportionate membership in the class of children living with 
162. See SALUTER, supra note 6, at 44, 52 (reporting that more than 80% of White 
children under 181ive with two parents, whereas only 38% of Black children do). 
163. See supra note 6. 
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both parents. 16-l An important part of the future of civil rights, I 
submit, is the future of Black children's well-being and their degree 
of preparedness for full and constructive citizenship. Those pros-
pects depend in no small part on Black children's joining the ranks 
of those fortunate enough to grow up in the care of two parents. 
164. Fewer than 8% of White children of parents with a graduate degree live with 
only one parent, whereas the parallel figure for Blacks is 28%. Among families earn-
ing over $50,000 annually, the percentage of Black children living with one parent is 
three times greater than the percentage of White children. See SALUTER, supra note 6, 
at 44-52; see also Charles Murray, The Partial Restoration of Traditional Society, PUB. 
INTEREST, Fall1995, 122, 125 (noting the overwhelming adherence to the two-parent 
family model of child rearing among White, well-educated professionals); id. at 125 
n.3 (reporting statistics compiled in the National Longitudinal Study of Youth 
showing that 41% of children born to Black women with a college degree were born 
out of wedlock, compared to fewer than 2% of White children, and commenting that 
"[t]his state of affairs in well-educated Black families presumably will have rever-
berating effects on many economic and social outcomes in the next generation"). 
